Approved for public release by the Capitol Police Board on October 7, 2026







SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS



2018 NATIONAL POLICE WEEK
A LEGACY OF HONOR

APRIL 1, 2018 — SEPTEMBER 30, 2018

United States Capitol Police

History

Created by Congress in 1828 following an assault on a son of John Quincy Adams in the Capitol Rotunda, the original duty of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) was to provide security for the United States Capitol Building. Its mission has expanded to provide the congressional community and visitors with a variety of police services. Those services are provided through a variety of specialty support units, network of foot and vehicular patrols, fixed posts, full-time Containment and Emergency Response Team, Canine (K-9) Unit, Patrol/ Mobile Response Division, and full-time Hazardous Devices and Hazardous Materials Sections. USCP had 1,923 sworn and 360 civilian employees as of September 30, 2018.

Mission

Today's USCP officer has the primary responsibility of protecting life and property; preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal acts; and enforcing traffic regulations throughout a large complex of congressional buildings, parks, and thoroughfares. With the signing of Public Law 112-74, USCP was given jurisdiction over the Capitol Reflecting Pool and Union Square. On June 8, 2017, USCP's jurisdiction was further extended to include the O'Neill Building, resulting from Public Law 114-254, adding to its concurrent jurisdiction with other police agencies, including the United States Park Police and Metropolitan (D.C.) Police, of an area approximately 200 blocks around the Capitol Complex. USCP is also charged with the protection of Members of Congress, officers of Congress, and their families throughout the entire United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.

Office of Inspector General

History

With Public Law 109-55 (August 2, 2005), Congress directed that the Capitol Police Board appoint an Inspector General (IG) for the Department. The IG was to be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.

On July 12, 2006, the Chairman of the Capitol Police Board swore in the first IG for the Department at USCP Headquarters—the Eney, Chestnut, Gibson Memorial Building in Washington, D.C. On November 19, 2013, the second IG for the Department was sworn in by the Chairman of the Capitol Police Board.

Mission

The IG is responsible for conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Department. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) examines, evaluates and, where necessary, critiques programs and operations, recommending ways to carry out departmental responsibilities in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible. OIG also audits, investigates, and oversees matters related to Department programs and operations, consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

Message from the Acting Inspector General

The United States Capitol Police (USCP) Inspector General, Fay F. Ropella, retired earlier this year and since her retirement, I have had the privilege of serving as the Acting Inspector General. It is my pleasure to present this Semiannual Report to Congress for USCP. The report summarizes work the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated and completed from April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018. The audits, investigations, and special reports described illustrate the continued efforts of OIG for promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of USCP programs and operations.

During this reporting period, Audits issued the following seven reports: *Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Compensatory Time*, Report Number OIG-2018-11; *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity*, Report Number OIG-2018-12; *Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards*, Report Number OIG-2018-13; *Audit of the United States Capitol Police Security Services Bureau Selected Contracts*, Report Number OIG-2018-14; *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Telework and Alternative Work Schedule Programs*, Report Number: OIG-2018-15; *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Office of Policy and Management Systems*, Report Number: OIG-2018-16; and a *Management Advisory Report: Outdated United States Capitol Police Civilian Employee Handbook*, Report Number OIG-2018-17. At the end of the reporting period, Audits had three ongoing projects—an audit of the USCP financial statements for the period ending September 30, 2018, an assessment of USCP contractor performance monitoring, and an audit of USCP email security.

Investigations issued six reports: *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team*, Report Number OIG-2018-10; *Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191*, Investigative Number: 2018-I-0002; *Evaluation of USCP and Library of Congress Security Systems Connectivity*, Investigative Number: 2018-I-0003; *Follow-up Analysis on United States Capitol Police Controls over Evidence*, Report Number OIG-2018-18; *Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct by a Senior Official*, Investigative Number: 2018-I-0005, and an *Inquiry into Allegations of Abuse of Process*, Investigative Number: 2018-I-0006.

[redacted]

Investigations continued to receive and evaluate Hotline complaints as well as conduct training with USCP personnel, including recruit officer classes.

On June 26, 2018, I testified before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on House Administration regarding the "United States Capitol Police: Operations and Workforce."

OIG provided correspondence to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the Committee on the Judiciary related to the Semiannual Report to Congress for the previous 6-month reporting period.

OIG staff members are fully committed to promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of Department programs and operations. I commend USCP, the Capitol Police Board (Board), and members of the oversight community for their professionalism and devotion to the USCP mission. We thank the officers whose service and sacrifice inspire our goal to achieve excellence through unity.

In closing, we look forward to the continued support of Congress, the Board, the Chief of Police, and the Department as we strive to use our oversight functions to promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency; improve USCP programs and operations; and ensure the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars.

Michael A. Bolton
Acting Inspector General

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Semiannual Report is issued pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, as amended, and summarizes the activities of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the period April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018. During this reporting period and at the close of the fiscal year, OIG directed its available resources toward areas of greatest risk for the Department. The work we completed helped promote the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. The accomplishments for each OIG component are summarized below.



OIG Audits issued seven reports: *Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Compensatory Time*, Report Number OIG-2018-11; *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity,* Report Number OIG-2018-12; *Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards,* Report Number OIG-2018-13; *Audit of the United States Capitol Police Security Services Bureau Selected Contracts,* Report Number OIG-2018-14; *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Telework and Alternative Work Schedule Programs*, Report Number OIG-2018-15; *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Office of Policy and Management Systems*, Report Number OIG-2018-16; and a *Management Advisory Report: Outdated United States Capitol Police Civilian Employee Handbook*, Report Number OIG-2018-17. At the end of the reporting period, Audits also had three ongoing projects—an audit of the USCP financial statements for the period ending September 30, 2018, an assessment of USCP contractor performance monitoring, and an audit of the USCP email security.



OIG Investigations issued an *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team,* Report Number OIG-2018-10; an *Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Training Class, Recruit Officer Class 191,* Investigative Number 2018-I-0002; an *Evaluation of USCP and Library of Congress Security Systems Connectivity,* Investigative Number: 2018-I-0003; a *Follow-up Analysis on United States Capitol Police Controls over Evidence*, Report Number OIG-2018-18; an *Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct by a Senior Official*, Investigative Number 2018-I-0005, and an *Inquiry into Allegations of Abuse of Process*, Investigative Number: 2018-I-0006. At the end of the reporting period, Investigations had ongoing a follow-up analysis of the USCP Intelligence Analysis Division.

Throughout this reporting period, the OIG staff continued working with the Department and stakeholders to maintain and foster open and effective relationships. On a wide range of issues relating to the work of OIG and USCP, the OIG staff maintained its active interaction with the Chief of Police, members of the Capitol Police Board (Board), and Congress through meetings, briefings, and dialogue with members and staff of the Department's authorizing and appropriation committees and subcommittees. In addition, OIG successfully continued with its active outreach and fraud program by presenting briefings to new employees and recruit officer classes.

LEGISLATION MONITORED

IG reviewed and monitored the following legislation:

H.R. 4043 ***Whistleblower Protection Extension Act of 2017***

H.R. 4395 ***Geospatial Data Act of 2017***

H.R. 4917 ***IG Subpoena Authority Act***

H.R. 4929 ***Stopping Improper Payments to Deceased People Act***

H.R. 5040 ***Export Control Reform Act of 2018***

H.R. 5321 ***Too Long; Didn't Read Act of 2018*** **or the** ***TL; DR Act of 2018***

H.R. 5402 ***Government Customer Service Accountability and Improvement Act of 2018***

H.R. 5415 ***Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act***

H.R. 5783 ***Cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies and Watch Act of 2018***

H.R. 5841 ***Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018***

H.R. 5925 ***Coordinated Response through Interagency Strategy and Information Sharing Act*** **or the** ***CRISIS Act***

H.R. 6147 ***Interior, Environment, Financial Services and General Government, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Transportation, Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2019***

H.R. 6229 ***National Institute of Standards and Technology Reauthorization Act of 2018***

H.R. 6237 ***Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019***

H.R. 6295 ***Cut the Perks Act***

H.R. 6550 ***FedRAMP Authorization Act***

S. 1869 ***Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act***

S. 2128 ***Geospatial Data Act of 2017***

S. 2178 ***Inspector General Recommendation Transparency Act of 2018***

S. 2276 ***Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act*** **or** ***GAO-IG Act***

S. 2374 ***Stopping Improper Payments to Deceased People Act***

S. 2630 ***Federal Travel Transparency Act***

S. 2948 ***Payment Integrity Information Act of 2018***

S. 3027 ***Modernizing Congressional Report Act of 2018***

S. 3107 ***Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2019***

S. 3153 ***Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019***

S. 3357 ***Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act***

S. 3398 ***A bill to require repayment of wasteful agency spending, and for other purposes***

VALUE ADDED

One method used for measuring our value is tracking the outcome of the recommendations in our reports, as codified in the IG Act of 1978, as amended. Since Agency inception in 2006, OIG has made numerous recommendations for improving programs and operations. While working alongside the Department, during this reporting period OIG added value in several areas, which allowed the Department to make significant progress to ensure that actions taken to close previous recommendations would continue, as well as resolving open recommendations.

Actions to Close Recommendations Continue

As part of a continued effort in promoting accountability to ensure the Department continues actions implemented to close previously issued recommendations, OIG conducts follow-up work on previously issued reports. In a previous audit, *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Proximity Cards,* Report Number, OIG-2015-05, dated April 2015, the Department did not have effective controls over the process for proximity cards. In that audit, OIG made five recommendations, which the Department implemented and OIG subsequently closed.

In our *Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards*, Report Number OIG-2018-13, dated June 2018—OIG identified lapses in corrective actions that impaired the closed status of recommendations issued in the original audit from April 2015.

In a meeting held on May 22, 2018, OIG recommended the Department develop an internal process for ensuring that it maintains continuity of corrective actions after recommendations are closed. On August 27, 2018, the Department notified OIG that resources were approved for assisting the Department in conducting internal reviews and ensuring continuation of corrective actions for closed recommendations.



VALUE ADDED (Cont'd)

Significant Progress in Resolution of Open Recommendations

During this reporting period, the Department continued its progress in closing open recommendations. As the following table reflects, OIG closed 24 previously open recommendations, some of which were older than 6 months. We believe that in time the Department will be able to close all of the open recommendations.

Report Title	Report Number	Recommendations Closed
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Proximity Cards	OIG-2015-05	1
Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis	OIG-2016-04	1
Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Purchase Card Program	OIG-2017-11	4
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Management Advisory Report: Potential Vendor Violation of United States Capitol Police Acquisition Policy	OIG-2018-07	1
Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs	OIG-2018-08	1
Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Monitoring of Internet Usage for Waste and Abuse	OIG-2018-09	2
Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191	2018-I-0002	3
Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards	OIG-2018-13	1
Total		**24**

Source: OIG generated from its Audit Recommendation Tracking System (ARTS).

During this reporting period, the Department fully implemented and OIG closed recommendations in the following six reports:

- [redacted]
- *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Proximity Cards*, OIG-2015-05
- *Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*, OIG-2016-04
- *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Purchase Card Program*, OIG-2017-11
- *Management Advisory Report: Potential Vendor Violation of United States Capitol Police Acquisition Policy*, OIG-2018-07
- *Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191*, Investigative Number 2018-I-0002

PROACTIVE EFFORTS

Management Challenges

The *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000* requires that OIGs identify and report each year on the most serious management challenges agencies face. When identifying challenges, we routinely examine audits where corrective actions were not taken, assess ongoing investigative and audit work to identify significant vulnerabilities, and analyze new programs and activities that could pose significant challenges because of range and complexities. We discussed challenges with Department officials and considered comments received. As in previous years, last year we reported on major challenges we believed to be the most significant management issues facing USCP. We expect to issue the management challenges for the Department in October 2018.

OIG Annual Performance Plan

On June 5, 2018, to ensure that OIG priorities appropriately considered stakeholders needs, we sought input from the Department, the Board, and our congressional oversight committees in developing our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2019*. We assessed the nature, scope, and inherent risks of USCP programs and operations. The assessment forms the basis for establishing our strategic and annual performance plans, including objectives and scope of work the OIG will accomplish within a specific period. Our annual performance plan is the OIG "roadmap" for audits, inspections, and investigations, which we plan for each fiscal year to evaluate the Department's programs and operations. We anticipate issuing the *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2019* during October 2018.

Outreach Activities

As part of a continued effort in promoting accountability through heightened awareness of the OIG role, mission, and services, we actively participated in presentations to Department managers and employees, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. We believe this initiative to be proactive and vital toward strengthening accountability by providing fraud prevention and awareness training to Department personnel.

Figure 1: OIG Special Agent conducts training and outreach with recruit officers.



Source: OIG photograph.

Figure 2: OIG Senior Auditor conducts training and outreach with new employees.



Source: OIG photograph.

AUDITS – ISSUED REPORTS

Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Compensatory Time (OIG-2018-11)

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG conducted an analysis of USCP compensatory (comp) time. The objectives of our analysis were to (1) evaluate the financial impact of comp time on the Department's overtime budget and (2) assess the effectiveness of the Department's policies and procedures. Our scope included comp time for Calendar Years (CYs) 2014 through 2017.



The *Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the FOP/U.S. Capitol Police Labor Committee and the United States Capitol Police, Effective June 8, 2010* (FOP CBA), and USCP Directive [redacted], dated October 13, 2015, sets forth the process for sworn or civilian employees to work authorized additional duty hours. The Directive states,

> "Employees may be required to work additional duty outside of their scheduled workweek or work period which may include working on a scheduled day off. Some additional duty may result in overtime compensation and will be governed by the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as applied by the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA). Employees holding positions determined to be 'non-exempt' from the FLSA shall qualify for additional duty compensation at 1.5 rate, for hours worked in excess of 80 hours per pay period or 40 hours per week (non-compensable meal times excluded) for sworn and civilian employees, respectively."

The FOP CBA states that employees may elect either comp time or monetary compensation for overtime. According to the Department's interim guidance, [redacted], dated February 24, 2017, "compensatory time is time off with pay that is earned in lieu of monetary compensation for either additional duty or FLSA overtime work." Based on CY 2017 data, non-exempt employees worked 769,957.75 additional duty hours. Of those hours, Department employees selected monetary compensation 88 percent of the time, with the remaining 12 percent selecting comp time.

Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Compensatory Time (OIG-2018-11) (Cont'd)

A significant financial impact exists to the Department related to using comp time in lieu of monetary compensation. Cost savings could be achieved if the Department (1) paid monetary compensation for additional work performed beyond the standard tour of duty in lieu of comp time, and (2) ensured that employees worked 80 hours before earning overtime at the 1.5 rate. Overtime costs are increased because of the compounding effect of comp time. Although allowable, changing current comp time policies and procedures could assist in better utilization of the Department overtime appropriation and its limited human capital. Changes would require renegotiation of the FOP CBA and a change to title 2, subsection 1313 (c)(4) of the United States Code [2 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(4)].[1]

Opportunities exist for improving effectiveness of time and attendance controls. The Department should finalize its interim guidance for absences and leave, which is more than a year old, and strengthen controls related to time and attendance accountability. Our analysis of CY 2017 data showed 217 instances for which the timekeeper made changes without explanation to an employee's unscheduled and scheduled leave. Because scheduled leave counts toward overtime, employees have an incentive to classify leave as scheduled instead of unscheduled to ensure that hours are included in determining overtime at the 1.5 rate. Unscheduled leave does not count toward the overtime threshold of 80 hours per pay period (non-compensable meal times excluded). Unscheduled to scheduled leave changes influence overtime costs and could lead to abuse if not monitored appropriately.

OIG made one recommendation, which the Department agreed to implement.

[1] 2 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(4) states that "Law enforcement personnel of the Capitol Police who are subject to the exemption under section 7(k) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 207(k)) may elect to receive compensatory time off in lieu of overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of the maximum for their work period."

Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity (OIG-2018-12)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, protects applicants and employees from discrimination in hiring, promotion, discharge, pay, fringe benefits, job training, classification, referral, and other aspects of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), or national origin. The Act established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to assist in the protection of U.S. employees from discrimination. Equality in employment practices is about ensuring individuals, applicants, candidates, and employees are treated fairly and consistently. Diversity in employment practices is about recognizing and respecting differences.

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, Report Number OIG-2018-01, OIG assessed USCP's workforce diversity. Our objectives were (1) determine if the Department properly designed a diversity program that would yield desired results, (2) evaluate the accuracy and completeness of complaints and discrimination data reported to stakeholders, and (3) assess the status of recommendations made in the previous diversity audit in 2008.[2] Our scope included program policies in effect as of January 2, 2018, and data collected during the five previous years, CY 2012 through CY 2017.

Although not required, the Department implemented some of the EEOC and Government Accountability Office (GAO) best practices for establishing and maintaining effective diversity and equal employment opportunity program. The Chief of Police is committed to diversity and believes that by continuing to follow best practices, the Department will develop an environment of diversity.

The Department did not design a diversity program that completely measures desired program results. Without Department policies for identifying specific program objectives in alignment with best practices and measurement procedures, the Department cannot be certain that they are accomplishing diversity goals.

The Department also did not have an integrated system for collecting data related to equality or diversity issues. Although the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) collects and reports complaints and discrimination issues, Department employees have not historically reported all complaints to OPR. The CAA allows employees to elect to report complaints to the Office of Compliance. Without a mechanism for consistently collecting data related to equality or diversity issues, the Department cannot accurately measure discrimination data.

[2] *Audit of United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity*, OIG-2008-05, dated July 2008.

AUDITS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity (OIG-2018-12) (Cont'd)

The Department did not maintain the corrective actions implemented to close the recommendations related to Report Number OIG-2008-05, the previous workforce diversity audit. That audit made four recommendations. OIG closed recommendations in March 2010 when the Department presented evidence through the audit resolution process that corrective actions were complete. Through this assessment, however, OIG identified lapses in corrective actions that impaired the closed status of two previous recommendations.

OIG made five recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement.



Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards (OIG-2018-13)

In a previous audit, *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Proximity Cards,* Report Number OIG-2015-05, dated April 2015, OIG found the Department did not have effective controls over the process for proximity (prox) cards. To develop more effective controls over the process, OIG made five recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. Although the Department fully implemented four of the recommendations, one remained open.

In February 2017, GAO updated its *High Risk Series,* GAO-17-317, which states that the Federal Government could do more to improve the capacity and monitoring of physical security. In response, OIG conducted a follow-up on the Department's implementation of recommendations contained within Report Number OIG-2015-05. The objectives of the follow-up were to confirm that the Department took the appropriate corrective actions and that controls the Department implemented were operating efficiently and effectively. Our scope included existing controls over prox cards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through February 28, 2018, related to implementation of recommendations outlined in our previous report.

We conducted interviews and reviewed relevant documentation to gain an understanding of the Department's implementation of recommendations. When we began this engagement, Recommendation 1 of the previous report remained open. During the engagement, we identified lapses in corrective actions that impaired the closed status of the other four recommendations. Based on our work, the conditions identified in the previous audit re-emerged as a result of a lack of continuity in the Department's corrective actions. Prior to issuance of the final report, the Department updated a directive and issued a new standard operating procedure (SOP) that affected Recommendation 1 in the prior report. OIG reviewed the updated directive and new SOP and concluded that the Department designed the procedures appropriately to mitigate the deficiency noted in the prior report and this follow-up report. Thus, OIG closed Recommendation 1 from the earlier report.

During the follow-up, however, we identified other matters that warranted the Department's attention. For example, we reviewed a sample of separation checklists and noted that of the 12 samples reviewed, 2 used outdated checklists that did not include a sign-off signature line for the Security Services Bureau (SSB). We also noted instances in which data within the proximity card systems were not accurate. OIG made six recommendations which the Department agreed to implement.

AUDITS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Audit of the United States Capitol Police Security Services Bureau Selected Contracts (OIG-2018-14)

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG initiated an audit of SSB's Selected Contracts. OIG's objectives were to determine if the Department, (1) established adequate policies and procedures to monitor contractor activities, (2) established effective controls to prevent inefficient contractor practices, (3) and complied with applicable laws, regulations, and guidance pertaining to the management and administration of the selected contracts. Our scope included controls, processes, and operations through March 31, 2018.

SSB had seven contracts totaling $21.2 million. Of the seven, we selected two contracts to ensure they met the stated objectives. The Department obligated $2.7 million and $11.1 million for the contracts, which covered June 30, 2017, through June 29, 2018, and September 1, 2016, through June 30, 2018, respectively.

Overall, SSB had adequate internal controls for the selected contracts and complied with policies and procedures. The Department had adequate internal controls and processes for monitoring contractor activities and preventing inefficient contractor practices, and the SSB controls ensured consistent monitoring of contracts and proper authorization of payments. The Department complied with policies and procedures related to the contracting process. OIG did not issue any recommendations.



AUDITS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Telework and Alternative Work Schedule Programs (OIG-2018-15)

Laws encouraging telework and alternative work schedules (AWSs) have been in effect in the Federal Government sector for more than 2 decades. Congress and the President signaled their support for flexible work-life programs by passing the *Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act of 1982*, Public Law 97-221, under title 5 of United States Code. The *Telework Enhancement Act of 2010*, Public Law 111-292, requires that each executive branch agency establish and implement a policy under which employees shall be authorized to telework.



The Department established a civilian telework program in 2010. According to a Department official, USCP began practicing AWS "in the 2008/2009 time period."

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG conducted an assessment of the Department's Telework and AWS Programs. Our objectives were to determine if (1) the Department had sufficient telework and alternative work schedule program guidance, (2) the ability to measure program utilization, and (3) assess the administration of the program in accordance with best practices. Our scope included program policies in effect as of March 31, 2018 and applicable data from CY 2017.

The Department did not have sufficient program guidance for implementing key best practices or identifying and documenting benefits associated with telework and AWS. Additionally, the Department did not have the ability to measure program utilization. For example, USCP did not have a methodology for collecting, validating, and reporting telework and AWS data. Finally, the Department did not administer the Telework and AWS programs in accordance with best practices. For example, the Department's program coordinator did not maintain all telework agreements. USCP should make improvements that will ensure success of the USCP Telework and AWS programs.

OIG made five recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement.

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Office of Policy and Management Systems (OIG-2018-16)

The USCP Office of Policy and Management Systems (OPOL) administers the Department's written directive system and publishes SOPs. As of June 13, 2018, the Department had 167 published Directives and 621 published SOPs. The Department also had eight pieces of interim guidance awaiting final approval and publication.

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG initiated a performance audit of OPOL. Our objectives were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (2) complied with applicable policies and procedures, as well, as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope included controls, processes, and operations during FY 2017 through May 2018.

The Department lacked internal controls for ensuring that rescinded and outdated Directives and SOPs were removed from PoliceNet.[3] As of July 23, 2018, PoliceNet contained 14 rescinded Directives or SOPs. Although it rescinded the Directives and SOPs, the Department did not review and validate PoliceNet content to ensure that outdated publications were removed. Without review and validation of PoliceNet publications, employees could have relied on outdated or incorrect information and requirements. OPOL removed outdated and rescinded material from the PoliceNet once OIG notified the Office of its presence.

USCP did not always comply with policies and procedures. For example, the Department lacked required documentation for 2 of 15 sampled new forms. Without following a consistent and repeatable process for publishing forms, the Department could prematurely publish a form without documentation of the review process.

USCP also lacked criteria for determining which SOPs should be restricted. According to a Department official, SOPs are restricted based on the judgment of the associated Bureau or Office's chain of command. Lack of formal guidance for SOP sensitivity determination and restriction could result in policies and procedures being inappropriately or inadvertently restricted.


OIG made three recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement.

[3] PoliceNet is the Department's intranet.

AUDITS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Management Advisory Report: Outdated United States Capitol Police Civilian Employee Handbook (OIG-2018-17)

During an interview related to the FY 2018 Financial Statement Audit, a Department official informed OIG that the Department was still distributing the *Civilian Employee Handbook* dated March 7, 1997, to new civilian employees. PoliceNet also included a copy of the handbook. OIG reviewed the handbook and found outdated or obsolete references.



The GAO's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,* dated September 2014, states, "Management periodically reviews policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity's objectives or addressing related risks." USCP had not, however, reviewed and updated the *Civilian Employee Handbook* since 1997.

Without an up-to-date *Civilian Employee Handbook*, new employees may rely on outdated or incorrect information which may affect the overall operations of USCP. Additionally, when new employees receive such an outdated document, it may cause them to question the professionalism of the Department and they may lose confidence in their new employer.

Our limited analysis focused on information that was readily apparent to be outdated or incorrect information in the *Civilian Employee Handbook*. Because of the nature and brevity of the work, OIG did not conduct the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Had we followed such standards, other matters might have come to our attention, and we may have identified additional instances of outdated or incorrect information.

OIG made one recommendation, which the Department agreed to implement.

AUDITS – ON-GOING PROJECTS

Audit of USCP Fiscal Year 2018 Financial Statements



OIG began an audit of the Department's 2018 principal financial statements. The primary objective of the audit is to express an opinion on whether the Department's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, and in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. We will evaluate and report on compliance with laws and regulations related to the financial statements. We will also opine on the effectiveness of the Department's internal controls over financial reporting. The review is based on the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and is being conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and *Government Auditing Standards*, also issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. OIG expects to issue the report on or before December 14, 2018.

Fiscal Year 2018 Management Letter

The management letter—prepared by OIG — will discuss a number of internal control deficiencies identified during the audit of the FY 2018 financial statements. Those control deficiencies, if addressed, should enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of internal controls. We believe that the deficiencies, although of concern, did not rise to the level necessary to be included in the report on the financial statement audit. We will evaluate compliance during future audits of USCP financial statements. OIG expects to issue the report on or before December 14, 2018.

AUDITS – ON-GOING PROJECTS (Cont'd)

Assessment of United States Capitol Police Contractor Performance Monitoring



In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG began an assessment of USCP contractor performance monitoring. OIG objectives of the assessment are (1) determine if the Department had a contractor performance monitoring program, (2) evaluate the accuracy and completeness of contractor performance data, and (3) assess USCP compliance with the monitoring program. Our scope includes program policies in effect as of August 31, 2018, and data requested from CY 2017 and CY 2018.

OIG expects to issue our report on or before December 31, 2018.

Analysis of United States Capitol Police Email Security

To begin work identified for FY 2019, OIG initiated an analysis of USCP email security. Our objectives are to determine if the Department (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring security over the Department's email system, and (2) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope includes controls, processes and operations during FY 2018.



OIG expects to issue our report on or before March 31, 2019.

INVESTIGATIONS – ISSUED REPORTS

Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team (OIG-2018-10) (Investigative Number 2018-I-0001)

According to the USCP Directive [redacted] dated April 25, 2016, the goal of the USCP Hazardous Materials Response Program is to provide a high level of hazardous materials response capability for the congressional community. The program primarily consists of the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) from the Hazardous Incident Response Division (HIRD) and is a full-time assignment for civilian employees. By contrast, the Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team (ALERT) is a collateral duty assignment for sworn officers and provides the Department with [redacted]

In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018*, OIG conducted an assessment to determine if the Department (1) established adequate processes for ensuring efficient and effective operations, and (2) complied with applicable guidance. Our scope included internal controls, processes, and operations during FY 2016 and FY 2017.

Overall, the Department had adequate internal controls for ALERT and complied with its policies and procedures. OIG did not make any recommendations, but we do encourage the Department to conduct drills on the Capitol Complex allowing officers to train in the environment in which they will be responding to an event. In addition, training at the Capitol Complex rather than the Cheltenham, Maryland facility would provide the Department a base-line in response time to a hazardous materials event.

INVESTIGATIONS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191
(Investigative Number 2018-I-0002)



The Department's Entry-Level Training Academy (the Academy) at Cheltenham, Maryland is part of the USCP's Entry-Level Training Program. According to the [redacted], dated April 2016, recruits must pass a series of written exams and practical exercises in order to successfully complete and graduate from the Academy. This includes passing the operational skills final practical exercises. The operational skills final practical exercises consist of 3 scenarios. If recruits fail more than one scenario, the Academy recommends their removal from training. USCP Recruit Officer Class (ROC) 191 began training on August 21, 2017. On March 10, 2018, ROC 191 completed its operational skills final practical exercises. 16 recruits failed 2 of 3 scenarios and the Academy recommended their removal from training.

At the request of the USCP Chief Administrative Officer and the Board, OIG conducted an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 16 recruits' unsuccessful completion of USCP recruit officer training. Our inquiry included the ROC 191 recruit training, hiring process, and opportunities or steps to ensure successful completion of ROCs.

The inquiry revealed certain circumstances surrounding 16 recruits' unsuccessful completion of USCP recruit officer training. The Department has opportunities and has already taken steps to improve its training and hiring process for new recruits. Circumstances such as class size, weather, Government shutdowns, possible advance knowledge of final scenarios, and generational learning style differences surrounded ROC 191 training. For example, multiple Department officials stated it is harder to manage a class of 48 than a class of 24 because the larger class size increases the potential for problems and makes it harder for instructors to become familiar with the class. USCP plans to have ROCs with only 24 recruits from this point forward. Multiple Department officials described ROC 191 as a young class and identified generational learning style differences they had noticed recently with younger recruits. A USCP official stated the Department has considered developing additional training to address these generational learning style differences.

Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191
(Investigative Number 2018-I-0002)

Circumstances related to psychological testing and oral board interviews surrounded the ROC 191 hiring process. For example, USCP uses a rotating board with a rank of Sergeant or above for its oral board selection interviews. A USCP official believed the Department could improve the oral board process if it used a more permanent oral board of sworn employees with the rank of Captain or above because those individuals have more experience to rely upon when evaluating the candidates. According to guidance from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, a typical interview panel "consists of two or more persons who have extensive knowledge of the job and are trained in administering interviews."

Limiting the size of ROCs to 24 recruits, developing additional training to address generational learning differences, and using a trained oral board of sworn employees with the rank of Captain or above would improve the Department's training and hiring process for new recruits. OIG made three recommendations, which the Department has already implemented.

Figure 3: Swearing in of USCP Recruit Officers.



Source: uscp.gov.

INVESTIGATIONS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Evaluation of United States Capitol Police and Library of Congress Security Systems Connectivity (Investigative Number 2018-I-0003)



In accordance with our *Annual Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2018,* OIG began planning for an evaluation of USCP and the Library of Congress (LOC) security systems connectivity.

During planning, OIG found USCP did not have sole control or custody over LOC security systems. Public Law 110-178, *U.S. Capitol Police and Library of Congress Police Merger Implementation Act of 2007* and Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Capitol Police and Library of Congress dated September 29, 2009, specifies that USCP and LOC will operate security systems at the LOC in consultation and coordination with each other. As a result, OIG would not be able to make recommendations for USCP management to take corrective action and did not go any further with the project.

Follow-up Analysis on United States Capitol Police Controls over Evidence (OIG-2018-18) (Investigative Number 2018-I-0004)



In a previous audit—the *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Evidence,* Report Number OIG-2015-03, dated March 2015— OIG found that the Department should improve internal controls for ensuring the integrity of physical evidence collected, secured, and processed. To establish more efficient and effective controls over accountability of evidence, we made seven recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. As of January 19, 2017, OIG had closed all seven of the recommendations based on comments and documentation the Department provided.

As part of its general oversight responsibility for USCP, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number OIG-2015-03.

INVESTIGATIONS – ISSUED REPORTS (Cont'd)

Follow-up Analysis on United States Capitol Police Controls over Evidence (OIG-2018-18)
(Investigative Number 2018-I-0004)

Our objective for the follow-up analysis was to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Our scope included existing controls over evidence related to the implementation of recommendations as outlined in our previous report.

We conducted interviews, site visits, and reviewed relevant documentation to gain an understanding of the Department's implementation of recommendations. Based on our follow-up, a condition identified in the previous report reemerged. The Department's Crime Scene Search Unit (CSS) could not provide documentation to support that it conducted routine internal inspections or audits of its evidence. The requirements included in Draft policies CSS provided to OIG would, however, clarify the frequency and substance of CSS internal inspections and audits.

During follow-up work, a matter related to the CSS Evidence Room came to our attention. During a site visit, OIG observed the CSS Evidence Room did not appear to have sufficient storage space for the evidence. Failure to maintain sufficient space for evidence storage could have increased the risk of the Department improperly storing or securing evidence. OIG made two recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement.

Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct by a Senior Official
(Investigative Number 2018-I-0005)

OIG received a referral on July 31, 2018, from the Chief of Police stating the Committee on House Administration heard that a senior official had engaged in a physical confrontation with a sworn officer, in violation of USCP Directive [redacted], dated November 19, 2012. OIG conducted an inquiry into the allegations and did not find any evidence substantiating the allegation. OIG closed the inquiry on August 17, 2018.

Inquiry into Allegations of Abuse of Process
(Investigative Number 2018-I-0006)

On August 28, 2018, OIG received a complaint alleging that the Department covered up an incident involving a former sworn officer. OIG conducted an inquiry into the allegations but did not find evidence substantiating that the Department covered up an assault in violation of USCP Directive [redacted], dated November 19, 2012. OIG closed the inquiry on September 10, 2018.

INVESTIGATIONS – ON-GOING PROJECTS



APPENDIX 1
REPORTS ISSUED

Report Number	Report Title
OIG-2018-10	*Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Advanced Law Enforcement Response Team (Investigative Number 2018-I-0001)*
OIG-2018-11	*Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Compensatory Time*
OIG-2018-12	*Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Workforce Diversity*
OIG-2018-13	*Follow-up on United States Capitol Police Controls over Proximity Cards*
OIG-2018-14	*Audit of the United States Capitol Police Security Services Bureau Selected Contracts*
OIG-2018-15	*Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Telework and Alternative Work Schedule Programs*
OIG-2018-16	*Audit of the United States Capitol Police Office of Policy and Management Systems*
OIG-2018-17	*Management Advisory Report: Outdated United States Capitol Police Civilian Employee Handbook*
OIG-2018-18	*Follow-up Analysis on United States Capitol Police Controls over Evidence (Investigative Number 2018-I-0004)*
Total: 9	

Investigative Number	Title
2018-I-0002	*Inquiry into Circumstances Surrounding the Unsuccessful Completion of United States Capitol Police Recruit Officer Training, Recruit Officer Class 191*
2018-I-0003	*Evaluation of United States Capitol Police and Library of Congress Security Systems Connectivity*
2018-I-0005	*Inquiry into Allegations of Misconduct by a Senior Official*
2018-I-0006	*Inquiry into Allegations of Abuse of Process*
Total: 4	

APPENDIX 2
RESOLUTION OF REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Timely resolution of outstanding recommendations continues to be a priority for the Department as well as OIG. As of September 30, 2018, OIG made a total of 414 recommendations to the Department since OIG inception. Of those 414 recommendations, the Department has fully implemented (or closed) 354. Of the remaining 60 open unimplemented recommendations, 38 of the open recommendations were older than 6 months as shown in the following table.

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01 2017-02 2018-04	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs 2010/2009 FS* *FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS* *FY 2016 FS* *FY 2017 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1	**Payroll Processing –** We recommended USCP consistently implement T&A [time and attendance] certification policies and procedures and that timekeepers review all certification reports to ensure that employees and supervisors sign and date reports. (1) USCP management needs to enforce the revised policies and procedures in Special Directive [redacted], (2) we also recommended that the supervisor/timekeeper procedures for monitoring T&A include identifying habitual failures in submitting certification reports so that corrective actions can be targeted to those employees, and (3) we recommended that USCP evaluate the feasibility of using [redacted], T&A system, to automate the T&A Certification process. [redacted]
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01 2017-02 2018-04	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs2010/2009 FS FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS* *FY 2016 FS* *FY 2017 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2	**Payroll Processing –** As in the prior year's recommendation, USCP should perform monthly reconciliation between the National Finance Center (NFC) and [redacted] to ensure leave balance information is correctly reported in both systems. We also recommended that the Office of Human Resources (OHR) implement corrective actions in a timely manner. [redacted]
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01 2017-02 2018-04	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs 2010/2009 FS FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS* *FY 2016 FS* *FY 2017 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3	**Payroll Processing –** We recommended that USCP ensure that its employees comply with USCP Special Directive [redacted] addressing responsibility to record daily worked hours using [redacted] time clocks. We also recommended that USCP enhance its procedures for monitoring employees who show a pattern of not clocking in or out and verify if hours entered in [redacted] are actual hours the employees worked. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2008-08	*Review of Compliance with United States Capitol Police Hiring Standards and with Directive* [redacted]	1	**Triple III –** We recommended that USCP in coordination with the Board update its hiring standards and establish a comprehensive hiring directive outlining the Department's vision and goals to create a talented and committed workforce, to support an effective organizational culture, and enhance the overall performance of the USCP. **Repeat Finding**: Recommendation 1: Evaluation of Compliance with USCP Hiring Standards, Directive [redacted]; and SOP [redacted] OIG-2017-04 [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	1	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP immediately update and implement its draft guidance for restricted duty to include updated information about organization elements and determine whether civilians should be beneficiaries of such a program in both Performance of Duty and Non-Performance of Duty cases. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	2	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP immediately implement its draft guidance for restricted duty to ensure more transparency and accountability of its program by requiring one individual to be held accountable for the controls and compliance of the restricted duty program, which will assist in ensuring compliance and the integrity of the program. The draft guidance should specifically provide the OHR, restricted duty program manager, the authority to monitor the restricted duty program, ensuring that employees submit complete forms and appropriate medical documentation, and coordinating employees return to full unrestricted duty in a timely manner. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	4	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP consider leave balances, multiple restricted duty assignments, and outside employment when assigning employees to restricted duty status. Furthermore, the Department should ensure that OHR receive restricted duty documentation to support assignments and provides consistent monitoring and employee enforcement of compliance with the program, which would identify any abusers of the program. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	5	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP immediately identify restricted duty positions throughout the Department and document duties associated with such positions, ensuring that the number of employees in restricted duty status does not exceed the number of available positions/assignments and employees are held accountable for performing meaningful and constructive tasks for the organization. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	6	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP establish a consistent process, which includes supporting evidence for revoking and restoring police powers and that such documentation is placed in the employee's personnel file. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	7	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP consider reducing the maximum length of restricted duty assignments, ensuring compliance with established time requirements, and eliminating Non-Performance of Duty injury cases from the restricted duty program, which could potentially result in cost saving to the organization. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	8	**Restricted Duty –** We recommended that USCP implement consistent monitoring and enforcement of employee compliance with restricted duty guidance, which should assist in identifying potential misuse or abuse of the program. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	1	**Leave Restriction Status –** We recommended that USCP complete its review of guidance related to Leave Restriction Status, make necessary updates, and reissue in the proper format to provide adequate instructions for Leave Restriction Status as it relates to both employees and supervisors. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	3	**Leave Restriction Status –** We recommended that USCP include a formal timeline requirement that OHR respond within 10 business days to a request for employee placement into a Leave Restriction Status. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	5	**Leave Restriction Status –** We recommended that USCP consider adding progressive discipline for anyone with a continuing pattern of leave abuse such as when an employee or officer is in Leave Restriction Status, that individual is not eligible for promotion or officer-requested transfers. This would serve as a leave abuse deterrent and help avoid patterns going undetected, especially when officers request transfers. [redacted]
2016-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*	1	**TSB –** We recommended that USCP establish a policy directed toward operation of the Department and the Training Services Bureau, which includes reviewing, updating and approving all training documents, including the [redacted] on a periodic basis, or more frequently as needed. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	**Report Title**	**Recommendation Number**	**Recommendation**
2016-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*	3	**TSB** – We recommended that USCP update or establish the review and approval process for in-service training for its SOPs by clearly identifying training components and clarifying the responsible component for conducting training, and the frequency of training. If the Training Services Bureau is determined to be the provider of the training, the SOPs should include the Training Services Bureau in the review and approval process. [redacted]
2016-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*	5	**TSB** – We recommended that USCP immediately update Directive [redacted], dated October 19, 2012, or establish a new directive, which provides a listing of in-service training requirements and the frequency with which such training should occur. Guidance would provide for review and approval by the Chief of Police of an annual training plan with a long-term outlook, which could assist in achieving a vigorous and motivated workforce that is highly trained and armed with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve the Department mission. [redacted]
2017-01	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Disciplinary Process*	1	**COP** – We recommended that USCP immediately update and formalize its policies and procedures on Discipline in order to equip employees with the knowledge that will ensure compliance. [redacted]
2017-01	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Disciplinary Process*	2	**COP** – We recommended that USCP provide annual training to managers related to correcting employee behavior through the performance or the misconduct adverse action systems, which have different standards and requirements. [redacted]
2017-05	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Compliance with Employee Performance Standards*	1	**Performance Standards** – We recommended that USCP update the Directives [redacted] dated May 28, 2012; and [redacted] dated May 28, 2012, to include controls for issuance, completion, monitoring, and documentation that will ensure accountability of the appraisal program. Monitoring should include a requirement for periodic reports to Commanders and Office Directors on the status of incomplete appraisals. [redacted]
2017-05	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Compliance with Employee Performance Standards*	2	**Performance Standards** – We recommended that USCP hold supervisors accountable for timely completion of performance plans and feedback to subordinates and document such efforts in annual appraisals for supervisors, thereby, ensuring accountability and compliance with directives. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	**Report Title**	**Recommendation Number**	**Recommendation**
2017-05	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Compliance with Employee Performance Standards*	3	**Performance Standards –** We recommended that USCP OHR use [redacted] to enhance monitoring, reporting, and documenting of employee appraisals. [redacted]
2017-06	*Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Backup and Recovery Capabilities*	3	**Information Technology –** We recommended that USCP define Department-level mission essential functions. Once Department-level mission essential functions are established, we recommend each bureau align business priorities that satisfy mission essential function requirements. USCP should also develop Department-level a continuity of operations plan (CONOPS). Once the Department approves such a plan, each bureau must ensure that its plan aligns with the Department requirements. [redacted]
2017-06	*Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Backup and Recovery Capabilities*	5	**Information Technology –** We recommended that USCP establish a Memorandum of Understanding [redacted]
2017-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Compliance with the Federal Employees' Compensation Act*	1	**OHR –** We recommended that USCP update its directives requiring that the OHR establish a monitoring system for periodic review of workers' compensation cases. The Department should also update USCP Directive [redacted] dated November 19, 2012, to include detailed instructions on how to maintain monitoring records including procedures for questioning workers' compensation payments. [redacted]
2017-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Compliance with the Federal Employees' Compensation Act*	3	**OHR –** We recommended that USCP OHR establish standard operating procedures for reporting suspected fraud, waste, and abuse of its Workers' Compensation Program to the United States Capitol Police Office of Inspector General. [redacted]
2017-07	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Compliance with the Federal Employees' Compensation Act*	4	**OHR –** We recommended that USCP update its policies and procedures to reflect compliance with proper receipt and retention of documentation through its recordkeeping system. [redacted]
2017-13	*Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Overtime*	2	**CDO –** We recommended that USCP develop clear and cogent written procedures regarding the preparing, distributing, reporting, and monitoring of overtime data to ensure that others understand the overtime process. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	*Report Title*	*Recommendation Number*	*Recommendation*
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	1	**OHR** – We recommended that USCP update Directive [redacted], November 18, 2014, to (a) identify the entity or individual responsible for monitoring pay to ensure employees do not exceed the maximum annual payable rate, and (b) explicitly describe the procedures for calculating and making adjustments to payments exceeding the maximum payable rate. [redacted]
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	2	**OHR** – We recommended that USCP update Directive [redacted], January 9, 2015, to reflect the increase in the Hazardous Duty payable rate that resulted from the [redacted] policy memo from the Chief Administrative Officer, dated January 8, 2016. [redacted]
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	3	**OHR** – We recommended that USCP update Directive [redacted] November 18, 2014 to (a) reflect establishment of the Police Training Officer Program, (b) identify the appropriate form to document and certify eligibility for Field Training Officer Pay, and (c) include policies and procedures specifying how the Office of Human Resources should perform and document the pay review to include developing a standard form that documents a recalculation process including the date and individual performing the recalculation. [redacted]
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	4	**OHR** – We recommend that USCP update Directive [redacted] April 7, 2015, to identify the appropriate form for documenting and certifying eligibility for Police Training Officer Pay. [redacted]
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	5	**OHR** – We recommend that USCP re-emphasize and re-educate certifying officials on the importance of the key criteria that employees must meet to qualify for specialty pay and reiterate that officials must reassess such criteria before each Form [redacted] is certified. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	7	**OHR** – We recommend that USCP update Directive [redacted] ovember 18, 2014, to include detailed procedures for completing, including signature blocks and dates, as well as processing Form [redacted].
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	8	**OHR** – We recommend that USCP update Form [redacted], to include eligibility blocks that will assist in ensuring compliance with applicable directives and remove from the form the section identified as Specialty Assignment.
2018-08	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Specialty Pay Programs*	9	**OHR** – We recommend that USCP conduct training reinforcing the importance of weekly submission of Form [redacted] to ensure that payments are in the correct fiscal year appropriation and in accordance with Directive [redacted], dated November 18, 2014.
2018-09	*Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Monitoring of Internet Usage for Waste and Abuse*	2	**OIS** – We recommend that USCP define the term "measurable interference" and consider ways to implement alerts in Office of Information System's tools to help identify waste and abuse.

Source: OIG generated from its Audit Recommendation Tracking System.



RECOMMENDATION RESOLUTION PROCESS

OIG *Audit Resolution Process and Terminology* requires written comments on the draft report and response to each recommendation made and whether the Department agrees or disagrees with each of the recommendations. In the initial response to the draft report, OIG does not require detailed explanations of implementation efforts. The Department comments to the draft report are included in their entirety in the final report as an appendix.

When the final report is transmitted, OIG requests responses to the report and information on actions taken or planned on each of the recommendations directed within 45 days of the date of the memorandum. Actions taken or planned are subject to OIG follow-up and reporting in accordance with resolution procedures. OIG tracks the Department response on all recommendations through ARTS. **As of September 30, 2018, USCP did not have any outstanding reports for which there was no "establishment comment."**

See Appendix 2, Table 1, and Table 2 for unimplemented recommendations older than 6 months, report recommendations with questioned and unsupported costs, and report recommendations with funds put to better use, respectively.



REPORT RESTRICTION LANGUAGE

~~*USCP OIG reports are in part, or whole, considered "Security Information" as defined by 2 USC § 1979 (a). Release of this information is governed by section 1979, title 2 of the United States Code (U.S.C. § 1979), applicable Capitol Police Board regulations, policies and procedures. This information must not be furnished outside of those entities that have a law enforcement need to know the information in OIG reports.*~~

~~*USCP OIG reports may contain sensitive law enforcement information and/or is part of the deliberative process privilege and disclosure could jeopardize law enforcement operations and may have national security implications.*~~

The Freedom of Information Act also explicitly excludes Congress (5 U.S.C. 551).



APPENDIX 3
PEER REVIEW REPORTING

Inspector General Peer Review Activity
April 1, 2018 – September 30, 2018

External Peer Review Requirement

The audit organization should obtain an external peer review at least once every 3 years that is sufficient in scope to provide a reasonable basis for determining whether, for the period under review, the reviewed audit organization's system of quality control was suitably designed and whether the audit organization is complying with its quality control system in order to provide the audit organization with reasonable assurance of conforming with applicable professional standards (GAS 3.96) as *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States require.

Peer Review of USCP OIG Audit Organization

As part of the 3-year cycle of independent peer reviews, on March 16, 2017, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) completed its external peer review of USCP OIG Audit Organization for the period ended September 30, 2016. USCP OIG received a rating of pass with no comments. Most importantly, such a rating provides our stakeholders with an additional comfort level upon which our audit work can be relied and used.

CIGIE has scheduled the Postal Regulatory Commission to conduct our next external peer review of USCP's OIG Audit Organization for the period ended September 30, 2019.

Peer Review Conducted by USCP OIG Audit Organization

CIGIE scheduled USCP OIG to conduct the external peer review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) for the period ended March 31, 2017. USCP OIG issued its last Reviewing Inspector General Report on June 30, 2017, to FLRA OIG.

Table 1

Reports Issued with Questioned Costs[4]
April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018

Category	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	No. of Reports	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period	1	$311,592	$310,392
Which were issued during the reporting period	0	$0	$0
Subtotal	1	$311,592	$310,392
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period			
• dollar value of disallowed costs	1	$11,726	$11,126
• dollar value of cost not disallowed	1	$299,866	$299,266
For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period	0	$0	$0
Reports for which no management decision was made within 6 months of issuance	0	$0	$0

Source: OIG generated from ARTS.
Amounts rounded to nearest thousand.

[4] A "questioned cost" denotes that one or more of the following three situations exist: (1) an alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, other agreement, or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

Table 2

Reports Issued with Recommendations that Funds Be Put to Better Use[5]
April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018

Category	Number of Reports	Dollar Value (in thousands)
For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period	1	$2,000
Which were issued during the reporting period	0	$0
Subtotal	0	$0
For which management decision was made during the reporting period	0	$0
• dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management o based on proposed management action o based on proposed legislative action	0	$0
• dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management	0	$0
For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period	1	$2,000
Reports for which no management decision was made within 6 months of issuance	1	$2,000

Source: OIG generated from ARTS.
Amounts rounded to nearest thousand.

[5] A recommendation that funds be put to better use is a recommendation by OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if Department management took actions to implement and complete the recommendations, including: reductions in outlays, deobligation of funds from programs or operations; withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the Department, a contractor, or a grantee, avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in preaward reviews of contract or grant agreements; or any other savings which are specifically identified.

Table 3

Investigations Statistics
April 1, 2018, through September 30, 2018

	Dollar Value (in thousands)
Recoveries	$0
Fines and Restitutions	$0
Investigative Cases Opened	5
Investigative Cases Closed	4
(Surveys, Analysis, Assessments, Evaluations, Inspections, and Internal Control Reviews) Opened	3
(Surveys, Analysis, Assessments, Evaluations, Inspections, and Internal Control Reviews) Closed	2
Arrests	0
Indictments	0
Convictions	0
Personnel Actions	0
Total Complaints Received	38
Hotline Complaints Received	33
Complaints from Other Sources	5
Complaints Referred (to the Department or other agencies)	11
Inspector General Subpoenas	0
Referrals to Prosecuting Authorities and Indictments from Prior Referrals	0

Source: OIG generated from its Investigative Case Tracking System.



OIG Hotline
(1-866-906-2446)

As part of its duties and responsibilities, OIG maintains a toll free Hotline that provides employees and private citizens an opportunity to relay information regarding fraud, waste, and abuse.

IG Act Reporting Requirements

IG Act Section	IG Act Requirement	Page
Section 4(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	3
Section 5(a)(1)	Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	7-15 18-22
Section 5(a)(2)	Recommendations for Corrective Action Made During the Reporting Period with Respect to Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	7-15 18-22
Section 5(a)(3)	Significant Recommendations Included in Previous Semiannual Reports on Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed	25-31
Section 5(a)(4)	Matters Referred to Prosecuting Authorities and Prosecutions and Convictions which Resulted	None
Section 5 (a)(5)	Summary of Reports Issued to the Head of the Establishment During the Reporting Period	7-15 18-22
Section 5(a)(6)	Reports Issued During the Reporting Period	24
Section 5(a)(7)	Summary of Particularly Significant Reports	7-15 18-22
Section 5(a)(8)	Questioned and Unsupported Costs (Statistical Table 1)	35
Section 5(a)(9)	Recommendations that Funds be put to Better Use (Statistical Table 2)	36
Section 5(a)(10)	Summary of Reports Issued before the commencement of the Reporting Period (A) for which no Management Decision has been made by the end of the Reporting Period; (B) for which no establishment comment was returned within 60 days of providing the report to the establishment; and (C) for which there are any outstanding unimplemented recommendations, including the aggregate potential cost savings of those recommendations.	35 None 36
Section 5(a)(11)	Significant Revised Management Decisions made during the Reporting Period	None

IG Act Section	IG Act Requirement	Page
Section 5(a)(12)	Management Decisions with which the Inspector General is in Disagreement	None
Section 5(a)(13)	Information Described Under Section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (Specifically excluded by Public Law 109-55.)	N/A
Section 5(a)(14-16)	Peer Review Reporting Requirements	34
Section 5(a)(17-18)	Statistical Tables and Metrics showing (A) Total Number of Issued Investigative Reports during the reporting period, (B and C) Referrals to Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution, and (D) Indictments from Prior Referrals	37
Section 5(a)(19)	Investigations Involving a Senior Government Employee where Allegations of Misconduct were Substantiated	None
Section 5(a)(20)	Descriptions of Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations Closed and Not Disclosed to the Public (Whistleblower Protection Act protections are part of U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board authorities that do not apply to the Legislative Branch.)	N/A
Section 5(a)(21)	Attempts by the Agency to Interfere with IG Independence	None
Section 5(a)(22)	Description of circumstances of; (A) inspection, evaluation, and audit conducted and not disclosed to the public, and (B) investigation conducted involving a senior Government employee that was not disclosed to the public. (Release of information governed by 2 U.S.C. § 1979 applicable to Capitol Police Board regulations, policies and procedures.)	N/A

Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspectors General

The *Inspector General Act* establishes for most agencies an OIG and sets out its mission, responsibilities, and authority. The unique nature of the IG function can present a number of challenges for establishing and maintaining effective working relationships. To work most effectively together, the agency and its OIG need to clearly define what each considers a productive relationship and then consciously manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

By providing objective information for promoting Government management, decision-making, and accountability, OIG contributes to the agency's success. OIG is an agent of positive change, focusing on eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse, and on identifying problems and recommendations for corrective actions by agency leadership. OIG provides the agency, Board, and Congress with objective assessments of opportunities to be more successful. Although not under the direct supervision of the Chief, OIG must keep the Board and Congress fully and currently informed of significant OIG activities. Given the complexity of management and policy issues, OIG and the agency may sometimes disagree on the extent of a problem and the need for and scope of corrective action. However, such disagreements should not cause the relationship between OIG and the agency to become unproductive. The following working relationship principles provide some guidance for agencies and OIGs. **To work together most effectively, OIG and the agency should strive to:**

Foster open communications at all levels. The agency will promptly respond to OIG requests for information to facilitate OIG activities and acknowledge challenges that OIG can help address. Surprises are to be avoided. With limited exceptions, primarily related to investigations, OIG should keep the agency advised of its work and its findings on a timely basis, and strive to provide information helpful to the agency at the earliest possible stage.

Interact with professionalism and mutual respect. Each party should always act in good faith and presume the same from the other. Both parties share, as a common goal, the successful accomplishment of the agency's mission.

Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the agency and OIG. The agency should recognize OIG's independent role in carrying out its mission within the agency, while recognizing the responsibility of OIG to report both to Congress and to the agency head. OIG should work to carry out its functions with a minimum of disruption to the primary work of the agency. The agency should allow OIG timely access to agency records and other materials.

Be thorough, objective, and fair. OIG must perform its work thoroughly, objectively, and with consideration to the agency's point of view. When responding, the agency will objectively consider differing opinions and means of improving operations. Both sides will recognize successes in addressing management challenges.

Be engaged. OIG and agency management will work cooperatively in identifying the most important areas for OIG work, as well as the best means of addressing the results of that work, while maintaining OIG's statutory independence of operation. In addition, agencies need to recognize that OIG also will need to carry out work that is congressionally requested, mandated by law, or self-initiated.

Be knowledgeable. OIG will continually strive to keep abreast of agency programs and operations, and agency management will be kept informed of OIG activities and concerns being raised in the course of OIG work. Agencies will keep OIG up to date on current matters and events.

Provide feedback. The agency and OIG should implement mechanisms, both formal and informal, that will ensure prompt and regular feedback.



CONTACTING THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Success of the OIG mission to prevent fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement depends on the cooperation of employees and the public. There are several ways to report questionable activity.

Call us at 202-593-3868 or toll-free at 866-906-2446. A confidential or anonymous message can be left 24 hours a day/7 days a week.



Toll-Free
1-866-906-2446

Write us – we are located at:
United States Capitol Police
Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations
119 D Street, NE
Washington, DC 20510



Or visit us – we are located at:
499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 345
Washington, DC 20003





You can also contact us by email at: OIG@USCP.GOV

When making a report, convey as much information as possible such as:
Who? What? Where? When? Why? Complaints may be made anonymously or you may request confidentiality.

Additional Information and Copies:

To obtain additional copies of this report, call OIG at 202-593-4201.

OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES
CAPITOL POLICE
INSPECTOR GENERAL