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UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL






SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

APRIL 1, 2016 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2016

United States Capitol Police

History

Created by Congress in 1828 following an assault on a son of John Quincy Adams in the Capitol Rotunda, the original duty of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) was to provide security for the United States Capitol Building. Its mission has expanded to provide the congressional community and visitors with a variety of police services. Those services are provided through a variety of specialty support units, network of foot and vehicular patrols, fixed posts, full-time Containment and Emergency Response Team, Canine (K-9) Unit, Patrol/ Mobile Response Division, and full-time Hazardous Devices and Hazardous Materials Sections. USCP had 1,773 sworn and 354 civilian employees as of September 26, 2016.

Mission

Today's USCP officer has the primary responsibility of protecting life and property; preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal acts; and enforcing traffic regulations throughout a large complex of congressional buildings, parks, and thoroughfares. With the signing of Public Law 112-74, USCP was given jurisdiction over the Capitol Reflecting Pool and Union Square—adding to its concurrent jurisdiction with other police agencies, including the United States Park Police and Metropolitan (D.C.) Police, of an area approximately 200 blocks around the Capitol Complex. USCP is also charged with the protection of Members of Congress, officers of Congress, and their families throughout the entire United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia.

Office of Inspector General

History

With Public Law 109-55 (August 2, 2005), Congress directed that the Capitol Police Board appoint an Inspector General (IG) for the Department. The IG was to be appointed without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.

On July 12, 2006, the Chairman of the Capitol Police Board swore in the first IG for the Department at USCP Headquarters—the Eney, Chestnut, Gibson Memorial Building in Washington, D.C. On August 11, 2013, Fay F. Ropella began her tenure as the second IG for the Department.

Mission

The IG is responsible for conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Department. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) examines, evaluates and, where necessary, critiques programs and operations, recommending ways to carry out departmental responsibilities in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner possible. OIG also audits, investigates, and oversees matters related to the Department's programs and operations, consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and policies.

Message from the Inspector General



I am pleased to present this Semiannual Report to Congress as Inspector General of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department). This report summarizes work the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated and completed from April 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016. The audits, evaluations, analyses, and investigations we describe illustrate OIG continued efforts for promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of USCP programs and operations.

During this reporting period, Audits issued three reports: *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*, Report Number OIG-2016-07; *Management Advisory Report, Violation Citation Process* [redacted]*/Collateral Funds*, Report Number OIG-2016-09; as well as a *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program,* Report Number OIG-2016-10. At the end of the reporting period, rather than contract for USCP's annual financial statement audit, Audits instead was conducting the audit of the Department financial statements for the period ending September 30, 2016, which resulted in a cost savings of about $340,000. Audits was also developing the OIG annual performance plan for fiscal year 2017. In addition, Audits was compiling the top management challenges for the Department. And, as *Government Auditing Standards* require, Audits was preparing for its third external peer review for the period ending September 30, 2016.

Investigations issued two proactive reports: *Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility,* Report Number OIG-2016-06 and *Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments,* Report Number OIG-2016-08. At the end of this reporting period, Investigations was working on several other projects, including an evaluation of the Department's discipline process—one that oversight committees requested; an inquiry into excessive use of mobile devices; and review of allegations of misconduct by a senior official. Investigations received and evaluated Hotline complaints and conducted outreach with USCP personnel, including recruit officer classes. OIG received 30 complaints, initiated four investigations, and closed two cases during this reporting period.

OIG provided correspondence to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and to the Committee on the Judiciary as well as the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform related to open and unimplemented recommendations; investigations involving GS-15 level or above employees; whistleblower retaliation; and attempts to interfere with Inspector General independence.

Notwithstanding the challenges faced during this semiannual reporting period, OIG staff members are fully committed to promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department's programs and operations. I commend USCP, the Capitol Police Board (Board), and members of the oversight community for their professionalism and devotion to the USCP mission. We thank the officers whose service and sacrifice inspire our goal to achieve excellence through unity.

In closing, we look forward to the continued support of Congress, the Board, the Chief of Police, and the Department as we strive to use our oversight functions to promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency; improve USCP programs and operations; and ensure the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars.

Fay F. Ropella

Fay F. Ropella, CPA, CFE
Inspector General

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Semiannual Report is issued pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, as amended, and summarizes the activities of the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the period April 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016. During this reporting period and at the close of the fiscal year, OIG directed its available resources toward areas of greatest risk for the Department. The work we completed helped promote the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. The accomplishments for each OIG component are summarized below.



OIG Audits issued three reports: *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*, Report Number OIG-2016-07; *Management Advisory Report, Violation Citation Process* [redacted]*/Collateral Funds*, Report Number OIG-2016-09; as well as a *Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program,* Report Number OIG-2016-10. At the end of this fiscal year, rather than contract for the Department's annual financial statement audit, Audits had an ongoing audit of the financial statements for the period ending September 30, 2016. That audit reflects a cost savings of about $340,000. In addition, Audits was in the process of developing the OIG annual performance plan for fiscal year (FY) 2017. Audits also was compiling the top management challenges for the Department. And, as *Government Auditing Standards* require, Audits was preparing for its third external peer review.



OIG Investigations issued two proactive reports: *Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility,* Report Number OIG-2016-06 and *Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments,* Report Number OIG-2016-08. Investigations has several ongoing projects, including an evaluation of the Department's disciplinary review process that USCP oversight committees requested; an inquiry into excessive use of mobile devices; and a review of allegations of misconduct by a senior official. Investigations also received 30 complaints, of which 25 were Hotline complaints and 3 were from other sources. OIG initiated four investigations and closed two cases as shown in Table 3.

Throughout this reporting period, the OIG staff continued working with Department and stakeholders to maintain and foster open and effective relationships. On a wide range of issues relating to the work of OIG and USCP, the OIG staff continued its active interaction with the Chief of Police (Chief), members of the Capitol Police Board (Board), and Congress through meetings, briefings, and dialogue with members and staff of the Department's authorizing and appropriation committees and subcommittees. In addition, OIG continued a viable outreach program by presenting briefings to new employees and recruit officer classes. OIG also continued as a contributing participant in the activities of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and in the legislative branch OIG activities such as regular meetings with other Inspectors General.

LEGISLATION MONITORED

IG reviewed and monitored the following legislation:

H.R. 2395, ***Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016***

H.R. 2532, ***EASY Savings Act of 2015 (Related to S.1387, Bonuses for Cost-Cutters Act of 2015)***

H.R. 5063, ***Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016 (Related S. 3050, Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016)***

H.R. 5795, ***Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2016***

H.R. 5839, ***Public Online Information Act of 2016***

H.R. 5920, ***Whistleblower Protections for Contractors Act***

H.R. 5922, ***Saving Federal Dollars Through Better Use of Government Purchase and Travel Cards Act of 2016***

S. 579, ***Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015***

S. 754, ***Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015***

S. 795, A ***Bill to Enhance Whistleblower Protection for Contractor and Grantee Employees***

S. 1387, ***Supplemental Security Income Restoration Act of 2015***

S. 1616, ***Saving Federal Dollars Through Better Use of Government Purchase and Travel Cards Act of 2015***

S. 2955, ***Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2017***

S. 3011, ***Bolster Accountability to Drive Government Efficiency and Reform***

S. 3050, ***Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016***

S. 3184, ***Back the Blue Act of 2016***

S. 3259, ***Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2016***

VALUE ADDED

While working alongside the Department, during this reporting period OIG added significant value in several areas, allowing the Department to continue its progress in resolving open recommendations and establishing procedures for the violation citation process and collateral funds.

Significant Progress in Resolution of Open Recommendations

One method used for measuring our value is tracking the outcome of the recommendations in our reports, as codified in the IG Act of 1978, as amended. Since Agency inception in 2006, OIG has made a total of 328 recommendations for improving programs and operations. During this particular reporting period, the Department continues making progress in closing recommendations by ensuring that they are fully implemented in a timely manner. As the table below reflects, OIG closed 20 previously open recommendations—12 of which were older than 6 months. In time, OIG believes that the Department will be able to close all of the Department's open recommendations.

Report Title	Report Number	Recommendations Closed
Performance Audit USCP Canine (K-9) Program	OIG-2013-04	1
Performance Audit United States Capitol Police Controls Over Ammunition	OIG-2014-03	1
Performance Audit of Hazardous Materials Response Team	OIG-2014-05	2
Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Controls Over Evidence	OIG-2015-03	2
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Management Advisory Report: United States Capitol Police Wage Garnishment Process	OIG-2016-03	2
Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis	OIG-2016-04	1
Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Public Web Sites and Web Applications	OIG-2016-05	1
Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility	OIG-2016-06	3
Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau	OIG-2016-07	2
Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program	OIG-2016-10	3
Total		**20**

Source: OIG generated.



VALUE ADDED (Continued)

Violation Citation Process [redacted]/Collateral Funds (Report Number OIG-2016-09), dated June 2016

During April 2016, the Department experienced a record number of arrests. However, because of a new process and new procedures, those arrests became more manageable for both a single day as well as the aggregate number of arrests for the month. The Department's new process—and the use of a Form [redacted]—helped the Department chart a new path for handling mass arrest situations and collecting funds.



At the request of the Deputy Chief of the Operational Services Bureau (OSB), OIG performed limited procedures of the new Form [redacted] process. Our objective was to determine if the controls for the new process were effective and actually ensured integrity of the collection, recording, custody, and transfer of collaterals funds generated from the [redacted] citations. USCP collected more than $40,000 in a single day.

The suggestions in our report about the new form helped assist the Department with its procedures as well as improve the integrity of the process. Suggestion topics included: (1) procedures related to accepting collateral funds, (2) reconciliations, as well as threshold amounts requiring routine transport of funds to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, along with audit responsibilities, and (3) criticality of segregation of duties related to the transport of funds to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and proper disposition of the obtained receipts.

[redacted]

PROACTIVE EFFORTS

Management Challenges

The *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000* requires that OIGs identify and report each year on the most serious management challenges agencies face. When identifying challenges, we routinely examine audits where corrective actions have not been taken, assess ongoing investigative and audit work to identify significant vulnerabilities, and analyze new programs and activities that could pose significant challenges because of range and complexities. We discussed challenges with USCP officials and considered comments received. As in previous years, last year we reported on major challenges we believed were the most significant management issues facing USCP. We expect to issue the management challenges for the Department in October 2016.

OIG Annual Performance Plan

On June 29, 2016, to ensure that OIG priorities appropriately considered stakeholder needs, we sought input from the Department, the Board, and our congressional oversight committees in developing our *Annual Performance Plan for FY 2017*. We assessed the nature, scope, and inherent risks of USCP programs and operations. The assessment forms the basis for establishing our strategic and annual performance plans, including objectives and scope of work the OIG will accomplish within a specific period. Our annual performance plan is the OIG "roadmap" for audits, inspections, and proactive investigations, which we plan to conduct each fiscal year to evaluate the Department's programs and operations. We anticipate issuing the *Annual Performance Plan for FY 2017* during October 2016.

OIG FY 2018 Budget

In August 2016, OIG completed planning for its FY 2018 budget. OIG reduced its general expense budget by $340,000, or 43 percent, by conducting the audit of the Department's annual financial statements.

Outreach Activities

As part of a continued effort in promoting accountability through better awareness of the OIG role, mission, and services, we provided presentations to Department managers and employees. We also continued with proactive activities for strengthening accountability by providing fraud prevention and awareness training to Department personnel, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Assistant Inspector General for Investigations conducts outreach with recruit officers.



Source: OIG Photograph.

AUDITS

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau (OIG-2016-07)

Figure 2: Recruit Training Class.



Source: USCP Training Services Bureau Photograph.

USCP maintains its Training Services Bureau (TSB) in Cheltenham, Maryland. It is frequently referred to as "the Academy" (Figure 2). TSB trains new recruits and provides in-service training to sworn and civilian employees so Department employees can more effectively fulfill the strategic plan, goals, and objectives of the Department.

In accordance with our annual plan, OIG conducted a performance audit of TSB to determine if the Department (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring that TSB maintained the integrity of its program as well as efficient and effective program operations and (2) complied with applicable laws, regulations, and guidance pertaining to management and operation of its training responsibilities. The scope of the audit included internal controls, processes, and operations from FY 2011 through FY 2015.

Overall, TSB did not establish internal controls and processes that would ensure efficient and effective administration related to training for new recruit officers. Neither TSB nor the Department had a formal process requiring routine updates and approval of its *Academy Rules and Training Standards*. Although TSB agreed that the chain of command should approve standards that level of approval did not occur.

The lack of oversight provided an environment in which critical grading criteria for use of force[1] changed from a 100-percent standard to 80 percent during Recruit Officer Class (ROC) 179 (March 20, 2015). As a result of that downward slip, *Academy Rules* issued to ROC 179 permitted eight recruits to challenge the test results on the use of force, which required remediation and allowed recruits to graduate with a lower level of proficiency in the use of force than sworn officers who had graduated earlier. The disparity resulted from a lack of coordinated implementation of policy and guidance and could have led to

[1] Directive [redacted], dated July 15, 2015, states, "It is the policy of the Department to allow officers to use only the level of force that appears reasonably necessary to effectively accomplish their lawful objectives (bring a subject under control), while protecting the lives of officers and others."

AUDITS

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau (OIG-2016-07) (Continued)

sworn officers not adequately completing their duties or inconsistently meeting Department needs. Instructor-graded examinations of recruits did not agree with scores transcribed to class ranking spreadsheets, resulting in the Bureau reporting inaccurate scores to management. TSB recorded preliminary scores rather than final scores. As a result, the Bureau risked graduating recruit officers who did not meet either of the established and approved April 1, 2015, and July 1, 2014, Academy Rules and Standards. According to an official of TSB, "staff tracks student progress very closely especially . . . failures."

Evidence was missing from training files because TSB did not have documented procedures for maintaining recruit officer files. Of the 35 recruit files reviewed, the Bureau could not locate 11 examinations, 17 graduation certificates, and an undetermined number of [redacted].[2] The inability to locate important documents was directly related to the lack of controls—which resulted in inconsistent organization of training documents. Without supporting evidence, TSB was not able to validate training scores as well as determine whether recruits met performance requirements for graduation.

The Department also did not have adequate controls over its in-service training and development of applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) because the process for training and development throughout the Department was decentralized. For example, some SOPs did not state which bureau or division was supposed to conduct training, the frequency of occurrence, or the substance of course material. In addition to a lack of a mechanism for reporting the training to the Bureau, controls for ensuring the training occurred were not in place. According to Directive [redacted], dated October 19, 2012, TSB is responsible for entering training data into its Training Management System. Other Department elements that conduct training enter completion of training into the Training Management System. Yet, as of the date of the audit (May 2016), procedures lacked specific guidance for ensuring other elements recorded or reported training. Without such provisions, the Department cannot be sure that training took place.

[2] [redacted] are used to document the counseling of recruit performance, related to misconduct, poor performance, or suggestions for improvement.

AUDITS

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau (OIG-2016-07) (Continued)

The Department's method for tracking overtime-training hours was not precise. The Department requested in its budget for several years—and had been provided—funding for overtime related to training. The methodology used for tracking overtime hours, however, required use of an indirect relationship between training and overtime and was based on a correlation that officer training requires another officer to backfill for an officer in training.

A disparity existed between how the Training Management System and [redacted][3] function. The Training Management System tracks training hours, while [redacted] tracks overtime hours. Neither system, however, could provide a complete list of employees who attended training and charged overtime. In the majority of cases, [redacted] recorded backfill hours as overtime and training time as regular hours. Such a methodology did not allow for validation of data. Without a control, the process was vulnerable to reporting that was not accurate as well as potential abuse. [redacted] is scheduled for upgrades and include a "scheduler" module, which should improve the accuracy of the tracking of overtime related to training.

Although it generally complied with guidance pertaining to management and operation of its training responsibilities, the Department could improve in those areas. For example, Directive [redacted], dated October 19, 2012, was out of date. [redacted] is the directive the Department issued to comply with The Commission of Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies[4] (CALEA) standards. Chapter 33 of the directive, *Training and Career Development Standards* 33.5.1, requires that agencies have written guidance requiring that sworn personnel complete annual training. The Directive did not specify, however, the training requirements or the frequency with which that training must be accomplished. Without specifics and frequencies for required training, establishing a long-term training plan will most likely remain a challenge. TSB cannot accurately prepare a long-term training plan in which resources are commensurate with Department mission requirements without a policy that requires a minimum annual training threshold. Lack of an approved long-term plan could leave the training resources vulnerable to either mismanagement or misapplication—both of which could be deleterious for the Department because it must maintain consistent application of training to guarantee that sworn officers possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities to accomplish its mission.

[redacted] is the name of the automated system used at USCP to collect, process, report, and maintain hourly/daily/weekly time, attendance, and leave data for USCP employees.

[4] The joint efforts of law enforcement's major executive associations created CALEA in 1979, as a law enforcement credentialing authority.

AUDITS

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau (OIG-2016-07) (Continued)

TSB was not able to implement consistent procedures that identify and follow up with supervisors regarding employees not completing mandatory training. Completion rates for mandatory training during 2013, 2014, and 2015 were 98.34 percent, 94.75 percent, and 86.64 percent, respectively. The Department has a long list of policies and procedures — each signed by the Chief—that require certain employees to complete training. However, the Department did not always comply with its policies and procedures for mandatory online training such as use of force. That guidance includes USCP Bulletins [redacted], dated November 25, 2013; [redacted], dated April 10, 2014; [redacted], dated June 1, 2015; and [redacted], dated October 30, 2015. As shown by the decline in compliance with the mandatory training requirements,

To obtain higher compliance rates, supervisors, employees, and the chain of command must respond to TSB follow-up efforts. Failure to follow up increased the risk that employees would continue to lack required skills. Constrained budgets make it essential that TSB is in the decision-making process when identifying the appropriate level of investment and establishing priorities for employee training and development. To ensure the integrity of its recruit and in-service training programs, the Department should establish effective controls. The Department should also update and revise training directives to ensure compliance with mandatory training requirements consistent with the Department's Strategic Plan. Additional improvements such as consistent evaluation of sworn officers would not only help reduce liability exposure but also address critical law enforcement skills and competencies. The Department agreed to implement the six recommendations OIG made for improving controls and compliance.

AUDITS

Management Advisory Report Violation Citation Process [redacted]/Collateral Funds (OIG-2016-09)



During April 2016, the Department not only processed record numbers of arrests for a single day but also for aggregate total number of arrests. The Department employed a new process—Form [redacted]—and helped chart a new path for the Department in terms of handling mass arrest situations. The new process helped make the procedures work and saved resources, thus making the mass arrests experienced during April manageable.

At the request of the Deputy Chief of the OSB, OIG performed limited procedures of the new [redacted] process. Our objective was to determine if the controls over the new process were effective and ensured integrity of the collection, recording, custody, and transfer of collateral funds generated from [redacted] citations.

The suggestions that OIG made assisted the Department in drafting its SOP as well as improve the integrity of the process related to [redacted] citations, such as (1) describing in detail the procedures related to accepting collateral funds, (2) including procedures for [redacted] reconciliations, as well as threshold amounts requiring routine transport of funds to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, along with audit responsibilities, and (3) explaining segregation of duties related to the transport of funds to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and proper disposition of the obtained receipts.

AUDITS

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program (OIG-2016-10)



The USCP Office of Information Systems (OIS) administers the Department's mobile device program. Although the mobile device program consisted primarily of Blackberry devices, the Department also had several Android and Apple devices and a limited number of flip phones from various manufacturers.

In accordance with our annual plan, OIG conducted a performance audit of the security of the Department's mobile device program to determine if USCP (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring security over Department-issued mobile devices, and (2) complied with policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. The scope of the audit included controls, processes, and operations during FY 2015 through January 2016. For the purposes of this audit, we considered cell phones and tablets as mobile devices. We excluded all other devices from the scope of this audit.

Although the Department established operating controls for mobile devices, some areas needed improvement. Those areas are as follows:

1. Developing and updating organizational wireless security policies and procedures addressing patching, use of Bluetooth technology, and vulnerability scanning for virus or malware on mobile devices.

2. Strengthening security over mobile devices, for example, sanitizing lost and stolen devices, whitelisting or blacklisting applications without an operational need. Those security procedures could prevent employees from installing third-party applications and connecting Department devices to unsecure Wi-Fi networks.

3. Developing and implementing a mechanism that could identify use of phone and data lines, which resulted in the Department paying for 59 phone lines that employees did not use during April 2016. Disconnecting unused lines could have resulted in about $3,000 in funds put to better use for the month of April 2016, or $36,000 annually.

Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program (OIG-2016-10) (Continued)

4. Updating the official mobile device inventory records when employees separate from the Department.

Without written policies and procedures, users are at risk of attackers hacking mobile devices and intercepting transmissions related to law enforcement sensitive information as well as using tools to secure USCP mobile devices such as restricting applications that have no operational need, and securing Wi-Fi networks. Operating with controls that are out of date can result in OIS risking that its System Security Plan no longer meets the minimum-security requirements for mobile device management, which may potentially result in the breach of law enforcement sensitive data on mobile devices.

The Department also did not always comply with policies and procedures. For example, OIS did not fully comply with baseline requirements for mobile device configurations documented in USCP Directive [redacted], dated October 19, 2012. In addition, USCP employees with access to Personally Identifiable Information on mobile devices did not sign annual compliance forms as USCP Directive [redacted] dated May 28, 2012, requires.

OIS has faced a turnover in key personnel and a shortage in budget, staffing, and training, which may have contributed to some of the control weaknesses and noncompliance issues. In January 2016, the Department hired a director for OIS and OIG is hopeful this will assist in resolving these issues.

To develop more efficient and effective controls over the Department's mobile device program, ensuring security and support for business processes as well as the mission of USCP, OIG made eight recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement.

ON-GOING AUDITS

Audit of USCP Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements



In accordance with our FY 2016 Annual Plan, in June 2016, OIG began an audit of the Department's 2016 principal financial statements. The primary objective of the audit was to express an opinion on whether the Department's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, and in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. We will evaluate and report on compliance with laws and regulations related to the financial statements. We will also opine on the effectiveness of the Department's internal controls over financial reporting. The review is based on the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and being conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and *Government Auditing Standards*, also issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. OIG expects to issue a report on or before December 15, 2016.

Planning, Annual Performance Plan, Management Challenges, Budget, and External Peer Review



At the end of the reporting period, Audits had a variety of ongoing projects such as planning for potential projects as well as developing and aligning the OIG *FY 2017 Annual Performance Plan* with USCP's new goals identified in the summer of 2015, and FY 2017 management challenges for the Department. In addition, OIG completed its FY 2018 budget and Audits was preparing for its next external peer review for the period ended September 30, 2016.

INVESTIGATIONS

Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility (OIG-2016-06) Investigative Number: 2016-I-0005



The USCP Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) oversees administrative investigations relating to the conduct of Department personnel as well as inspections of its organizational components. OPR also records and investigates allegations of misconduct by USCP employees generated from within the Department or outside sources. In accordance with the OIG annual plan and as part of our oversight responsibility, we conducted an independent inspection of OPR. Our primary objectives were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring the integrity of its program, and (2) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope included internal controls, processes, and operations during Calendar Year 2015.

OPR generally complied with the internal controls and processes for its investigations and case files. We reviewed a sample of 32 case files to determine if OPR completed the investigations properly and complied with applicable guidance. Our review of files did not reveal any instances of non-compliance with guidance or impropriety in the investigations. OPR did not document its procedures for conducting audits and inspections of property and evidence. OPR performs annual audits and unannounced inspections as part of the CALEA accreditation process. USCP Directive [redacted] dated May 28, 2012, designates OPR as the organization responsible for completing annual audits and unannounced inspections. While it used practices to complete the annual audit and unannounced inspection, the Department did not document those practices, although OIG recommended this in a previous report, *Performance Audit of USCP Controls Over Evidence* (Report Number OIG-2015-03), dated March 2015.

We concluded that opportunities may exist for improving OPR. For example, the Department could implement additional training as well as a rotation policy for investigators in OPR. OIG made five recommendations, all of which the Department agreed to implement.

INVESTIGATIONS

Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments (OIG-2016-08)
Investigative Number: 2016-I-0008

At the request of the Board, OIG conducted an analysis of USCP internal post assignments. Our objectives were to (1) detail full-time or recurring part-time internal posts manned by USCP officers, (2) determine the necessity of each post and whether the Department could staff it with civilian or sworn personnel, and (3) identify any potential personnel or cost savings if the Department could eliminate a post or staff it with civilian personnel. Our scope included full-time and recurring part-time internal posts manned by USCP officers as of April 11, 2016. OIG issued its final report in June 2016. ~~This report in part, or whole, is considered "Security Information" as defined by section 1979, title 2 of the United States Code, applicable Capitol Police Board regulations, policies, and procedures.~~



INVESTIGATIONS

Inquiry into Allegation of Misconduct by a Senior Official (Investigative Number 2016-I-0011)

OIG conducted an inquiry into an allegation that a senior official of the Department violated USCP Directive [redacted], dated November 19, 2012, by dereliction of duty. OIG did not find any evidence supporting the allegation and closed the inquiry on September 27, 2016.

Inquiry into Allegation of Lack of Response to Door Alarm at the Library of Congress (Joint Effort with Library of Congress OIG) (Investigative Number 2016-I-0012)

OIG conducted an inquiry into a July 12, 2016, security incident in the Library of Congress (LOC) Jefferson Building. The LOC OIG requested that OIG determine if any USCP officers responded to an alarm at the Jefferson Building. OIG conducted interviews and reviewed the Department's dispatch and radio records. OIG did not find any evidence or information substantiating USCP officers failed to respond to an alarm in the building on that date. The Department's dispatch and radio records showed that an officer responded and cleared an alarm and notified the USCP dispatcher that authorized Architect of the Capitol staff in the area. OIG notified Department leadership and the LOC OIG of its findings, and closed the inquiry on September 26, 2016.



INVESTIGATIONS ON-GOING PROJECTS

Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Disciplinary Review Process (Investigative Number 2016-I-0009)

In accordance with our FY 2016 annual plan, and at the request of USCP Oversight Committees, the OIG is conducting an evaluation of the USCP discipline process. Our objectives are to determine if the Department (1) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring that USCP employees subject to the disciplinary process receive due process based on transparency and fairness, and (2) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope includes internal controls, processes, and operations during FY 2014 and 2015. We expect to issue our report on or before November 2016.

Inquiry into Excessive Use of Mobile Devices (Investigative Number 2016-I-0010)

OIG Audits referred an issue related to excessive use of mobile devices to OIG Investigations. The audit found that six employees may not have complied with Directive [redacted] and Directive [redacted]. OIG expects to complete its investigation on or before November 2016.

Inquiry into Allegation of Misconduct by a Senior Official (Investigative Number 2016-I-0013)

OIG received a complaint alleging that a senior official engaged in discrimination, time and attendance manipulation, and providing false documents to a congressional committee. OIG is conducting an inquiry into the allegations and expects to issue a report in November 2016.

INVESTIGATIONS ON-GOING PROJECTS

OIG Hotline (1-866-906-2446)

As part of its duties and responsibilities, OIG maintains a toll-free Hotline that provides employees and private citizens an opportunity to relay information regarding fraud, waste, and abuse.



APPENDIX 1
REPORTS ISSUED

OIG-2016-06	**Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility (Investigative Number 2016-I-0005)**
OIG-2016-07	**Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau**
OIG-2016-08	**Analysis of United States Capitol Police Internal Post Assignments (Investigative Number 2016-I-0008)**
OIG-2016-09	**Management Advisory Report Violation Citation Process [redacted]/Collateral Funds**
OIG-2016-10	**Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Mobile Device Program**
2016-I-0011	**Inquiry into Allegation of Misconduct by a Senior Official**
2016-I-0012	**Inquiry into Allegation of Lack of Response to Door Alarm at the Library of Congress (Joint Effort with Library of Congress OIG)**

APPENDIX 2
RESOLUTION OF REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Timely resolution of outstanding recommendations continues to be a priority for the Department as well as OIG. As of September 30, 2016, OIG made a total of 328 recommendations to the Department since OIG inception. Of those 328 recommendations, the Department has fully implemented (or closed) 275, of the remaining 53 open unimplemented recommendations, 42 of the open recommendations were older than 6 months as shown in the following table.

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

Report Number	*Report Title*	*Recommendation Number*	*Recommendation*
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs 2010/2009 FS* *FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1	**Payroll Processing –** We recommended USCP consistently implement T&A [time and attendance] certification policies and procedures and that timekeepers review all certification reports to ensure that employees and supervisors sign and date reports. (1) USCP management needs to enforce the revised policies and procedures in Special Directive [redacted], (2) we also recommended that the supervisor/timekeeper procedures for monitoring T&A include identifying habitual failures in submitting certification reports so that corrective actions can be targeted to those employees, and (3) we recommended that United States Capitol Police evaluate the feasibility of using [redacted], a T&A system, to automate the T&A Certification process. [redacted]
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs2010/2009 FS FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2	**Payroll Processing –** As in the prior year's recommendation, USCP should perform monthly reconciliation between the National Finance Center (NFC) and [redacted] to ensure leave balance information is correctly reported in both systems. We also recommended that the Office of Human Resources (OHR) implement corrective actions in a timely manner. [redacted]
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01 2015-01 2016-01	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs 2010/2009 FS* *FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS* *FY 2015 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3	**Payroll Processing –** We recommended that USCP ensure that its employees comply with United States Capitol Police Special Directive [redacted] addressing responsibility to record daily worked hours using [redacted] time clocks. We also recommended that USCP enhance its procedures for monitoring employees who show a pattern of not clocking in or out and verify if hours entered in [redacted] are actual hours the employees worked. [redacted]
2009-01 2011-01 2012-02 2013-01 2014-01	*FY 2008 FS* *FYs 2010/2009 FS* *FY 2011 FS* *FY 2012 FS* *FY 2013 FS*	Repeat Finding 2.2H 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.1	**Financial Management –** We recommended that USCP develop a formal monthly reporting process from the program offices overseeing construction-in-progress to the Office of Financial Management (OFM) and provide signed confirmation that the financial reports from the partner agencies have been reviewed and accepted. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2008-08	*Review of Compliance with United States Capitol Police Hiring Standards and with Directive* [redacted], [redacted]	1	**Triple III –** We recommended that USCP in coordination with the Board, update its hiring standards and establish a comprehensive hiring directive outlining the Department's vision and goals to create a talented and committed workforce, to support an effective organizational culture, and enhance the overall performance of the USCP [redacted]
2012-01	*Audit of United States Capitol Police Enterprise Architecture*	1	**Enterprise Architecture –** We recommended that the USCP Office of Information Systems (OIS) immediately update its strategic plan to define objectives and goals that align with the short- and long-term goals and objectives of the Department. The plan also should incorporate goals on optimizing enterprise- wide information systems performance and accountability. [redacted]
2012-04	*AUP Time and Attendance* [redacted] *System*	6	**Time and Attendance –** We recommended that USCP continue its efforts to automate fully its labor management system, [redacted]. In addition, we recommended that United States Capitol Police consider integrating the Scheduler, Shift Trading functionalities, Leave Approval Interface, Virtual Time Clock, Electronic Timesheet Certifications, and others that would make its labor management system more efficient and effective. Such integration of functions would allow the Department to understand fully costs associated with performing a duty, such as staffing a door or entrance/exit point. [redacted]
2014-01 2015-01	*FY 2013 FS* *FY 2014 FS*	Repeat Finding 1.8 1.5	**Payroll Processing –** We recommended that USCP enforce its overtime policy. Lack of documentation to support overtime approval. [redacted]
2014-05	*Performance Audit of Hazardous Materials Response Team*	1	**HMRT –** We recommended that USCP evaluate the SOPs for the Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) as well as add controls that will confirm that the annual review process was completed and the HMRT and the Office of Policy and Management Systems guidance is consistent. [redacted]
2014-05	*Performance Audit of Hazardous Materials Response Team*	11	**HMRT –** We recommended that USCP evaluate its documentation processes related to medical monitoring and incorporate into SOPs a requirement for document retention that will allow for inspection of historic documents or other mechanism for ensuring consistent compliance with procedures. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2014-05	*Performance Audit of Hazardous Materials Response Team*	13	**HMRT** – We recommended USCP develop procedures for preparing supplementary information that will ensure the accuracy and reliability of program performance data. The procedures should include the OFM working directly with those in charge of the supporting documentation that ensures accuracy of figures presented in the Management Decision and Analysis. The supplementary information will be clearly defined so that the criteria can be consistently applied at the data entry, data retrieval, and data reporting levels. [redacted]
2015-01	*FY 2014 FS*	1.6	[redacted] **Database** – We recommended that USCP OIS develop and implement a process for monitoring use of [redacted] database accounts. [redacted]
2015-03	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Controls Over Evidence*	2	**Evidence** – We recommended that USCP establish SOPs for conducting inspections and audits of items secured within the Crime Scene Search Safe Room to include inspections and audits conducted by other offices within the Department. Specifically, the Department should include control procedures provided in a November 2013 memorandum, which provides the frequency of inventory/inspections/audits of evidence, the scope of the count, and when reports are due. In addition, the Department should consider weighing drugs as part of the inspection process. Most importantly, the Department should require appropriate supporting documentation of the counts of physical evidence and the proper signatures to ensure the change of custody of evidence. [redacted]
2015-03	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Controls Over Evidence*	5	**Evidence** – We recommended that USCP should review and update SOPs for the Crime Scene Search Unit. Specifically, update SOPs to (1) reflect changes in the Drug Enforcement Administration procedures for providing lab numbers (No. [redacted]) and (2) remove references to Polaroid film and include procedures for digital photography (SOP No [redacted]). [redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2015-05	*Performance Audit of United States Capitol Police Controls Over Proximity Cards*	1	**Proximity Cards** – We recommended that USCP update OHR policies and procedures related to proximity cards and require that the SSB remove access clearances for separated employees when notified by the OHR badging office. Policies should specifically state a required timeframe for OHR communication and SSB access removal. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	1	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP immediately update and implement its draft guidance for restricted duty to include updated information about organization elements and determine whether civilians should be beneficiaries of such a program in both Performance of Duty and Non-Performance of Duty cases. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	2	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP immediately implement its draft guidance for restricted duty to ensure more transparency and accountability of its program by requiring one individual to be held accountable for the controls and compliance of the restricted duty program, which will assist in ensuring compliance and the integrity of the program. The draft guidance should specifically provide the OHR, restricted duty program manager, the authority to monitor the restricted duty program, ensuring that employees submit complete forms and appropriate medical documentation, and coordinating employees return to full unrestricted duty in a timely manner. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	3	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP enforce the September 2011 draft interim time and attendance guidance to ensure that employees are using [redacted] time clocks; thereby, appropriately monitoring employees in a restricted duty status and ensuring individual time and attendance. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	4	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP consider leave balances, multiple restricted duty assignments, and outside employment when assigning employees to restricted duty status. Furthermore, the Department should ensure that OHR receive restricted duty documentation to support assignments and provides consistent monitoring and employee enforcement of compliance with the program, which would identify any abusers of the program. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	5	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP immediately identify restricted duty positions throughout the Department and document duties associated with such positions, ensuring that the number of employees in restricted duty status does not exceed the number of available positions/assignments and employees are held accountable for performing meaningful and constructive tasks for the organization. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	**Report Title**	**Recommendation Number**	**Recommendation**
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	6	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP establish a consistent process, which includes supporting evidence for revoking and restoring police powers and that such documentation is placed in the employee's personnel file. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	7	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP consider reducing the maximum length of restricted duty assignments, ensuring compliance with established time requirements, and eliminating Non-Performance of Duty injury cases from the restricted duty program, which could potentially result in cost saving to the organization. [redacted]
2015-08	*Applying Agreed-Upon Procedures: United States Capitol Police Restricted Duty Program*	8	**Restricted Duty** – We recommended that USCP implement consistent monitoring and enforcement of employee compliance with restricted duty guidance, which should assist in identifying potential misuse or abuse of the program. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	1	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP complete its review of guidance related to Leave Restriction Status, make necessary updates, and reissue in the proper format to provide adequate instructions for Leave Restriction Status as it relates to both employees and supervisors. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	2	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP reiterate the current requirement for Leave Restriction Status—six occurrences of unscheduled leave without documentation during a continuous 6-month period, looking at the previous 6-months from the date of the last infraction. In addition, supervisors should conduct regular (semi-annual) reviews of leave records across the Department so supervisors monitor unscheduled leave consistently. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	3	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP include a formal timeline requirement that OHR respond within 10 business days to a request for employee placement into a Leave Restriction Status. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	4	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that United States Capitol Police consider using a mechanized process as a tool for facilitating centralized monitoring of unscheduled and undocumented leave. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	5	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP consider adding progressive discipline for anyone with a continuing pattern of leave abuse such as when an employee or officer is in Leave Restriction Status, that individual is not eligible for promotion or officer-requested transfers. This would serve as a leave abuse deterrent and help avoid patterns going undetected, especially when officers request transfers. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	6	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP include a comprehensive discussion of leave procedures and the consequences of abusing leave in its new employee orientation. OHR should provide refresher training to supervisors upon promotion to supervisor, which should cover the topics of interacting with subordinates and monitoring leave. Training should be periodic, thus ensuring that all employees are aware of proper leave practices. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	7	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP consider requiring that supervisors issue a pre-Leave Restriction Status memorandum to employees on the instance of unscheduled leave prior to a formal request for Leave Restriction Status; this will serve as warning notice that leave restriction may be forthcoming and may assist in curtailing leave abuse problems. [redacted]
2015-09	*Independent Accountants' Report on Agreed-Upon Procedures of United States Capitol Police Leave Restriction Status*	8	**Leave Restriction Status** – We recommended that USCP consider adding a requirement for officers or employees in Leave Restriction Status for more than 1 year to check-in with USCP's attending physician or USCP-contracted physicians, ensuring that unscheduled absences are valid and physicians provide adequate documentation to support fitness for duty. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2015-10	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police's Fiscal Year 2015 Information Security Program*	1	**Information Security Program** – We recommended that USCP assign an appropriate official to (1) identify an appropriate risk management framework to implement Department-wide and (2) develop policies and procedures to implement the chosen risk management framework. [redacted]
2015-10	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police's Fiscal Year 2015 Information Security Program*	2	**Information Security Program** – We recommended that USCP assign an appropriate official to (1) identify the information security policies and corresponding procedures necessary to support the information security program Department-wide, (2) develop the identified policies and corresponding procedures, and (3) implement the finalized policies and procedures. [redacted]
2015-10	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police's Fiscal Year 2015 Information Security Program*	3	**Information Security Program** – We recommended that USCP develop (1) a process to ensure that the Department senior management, including the Chief, is regularly informed about the status of the information security program and (2) measurable key security metrics to report to senior management on a regular basis. [redacted]
2015-10	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police's Fiscal Year 2015 Information Security Program*	4	**Information Security Program** – We recommended that USCP assess whether it is viable and productive to place the OIS and Security Services Bureau information security resources under a common management oversight. [redacted]
2016-04	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*	1	**Chief Operating Officer (COO)** – We recommended that USCP update and formalize standard operating procedures for the Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis addressing all of its Sections including threat assessments, the "Open Source Newsletter," and security clearances. [redacted]
2016-04	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*	3	**Chief Operating Officer (COO)** – We recommended that USCP revise Standard Operating Procedures [redacted] to reflect any changes in processes for the Division of Intelligence and Analysis. [redacted]
2016-04	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*	4	**COO**– We recommended that USCP (1) establish strategic intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and (2) establish mechanisms for evaluating workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. [redacted]

Appendix 2 – Unimplemented (Open) Recommendations Older Than 6 Months			
Report Number	***Report Title***	***Recommendation Number***	***Recommendation***
2016-04	*Evaluation of the United States Capitol Police Division of Intelligence and Information Analysis*	5	**COO** – We recommend that the USCP maintain the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for its liaisons to ensure reasonable assurance those component analytic activities produce a product and resource investments are aligned with supported departmental priorities. [redacted]
2016-05	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Public Web Site and Web Applications*	2	**OIS** – We recommended that USCP provide management oversight of the staff responsible for password management. Staff should be apprised of the USCP policies and procedures and follow the guidance on a consistent basis. [redacted]
2016-05	*Performance Audit of the United States Capitol Police Public Web Site and Web Applications*	3	**OIS** – We recommended that USCP develop policies and procedures for public Web site applications. [redacted]





APPENDIX 3
PEER REVIEW REPORTING

Inspector General Peer Review Activity
April 1, 2016 – September 30, 2016

External Peer Review Requirement

The audit organization should obtain an external peer review at least once every 3 years that is sufficient in scope to provide a reasonable basis for determining whether, for the period under review, the reviewed audit organization's system of quality control was suitably designed and whether the audit organization is complying with its quality control system in order to provide the audit organization with reasonable assurance of conforming with applicable professional standards (GAS 3.96) as *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States require.

Last Peer Review Conducted of USCP OIG Audit Organization

As part of the 3-year cycle of independent peer reviews, on September 17, 2014, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) OIG issued the last peer review report covering USCP OIG Audits. USCP OIG received a peer review rating of pass for the year ended September 30, 2013. Furthermore, CFTC OIG had no comments or recommendations in its *System Review Report* of USCP OIG.

CIGIE has scheduled the Federal Election Commission to conduct the next USCP OIG external peer review of its Audit organization for the period ended September 30, 2016.

Last Peer Review Conducted by USCP OIG Audit Organization

CIGIE scheduled USCP OIG to conduct the external peer review of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) audit organization for the period ended March 31, 2015. USCP OIG issued its last Reviewing Inspector General Report on June 30, 2015, to FTC OIG.

Table 1

Reports Issued with Questioned Costs[5]
April 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016

Category	(Dollars in Thousands)		
	No. of Reports	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs
For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period	0	$0	$0
Which were issued during the reporting period	0	$0	$0
Subtotal	0	$0	$0
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period			
• dollar value of disallowed costs	0	$0	$0
• dollar value of cost not disallowed	0	$0	$0
For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period	0	$0	$0
Reports for which no management decision was made within 6 months of issuance	0	$0	$0

[5] A "questioned cost" denotes that one or more of the following three situations exist: (1) an alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, other agreement, or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

Table 2

Reports Issued with Recommendations that Funds Be Put to Better Use[6]
April 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016

Category	Number of Reports	Dollar Value (in thousands)
For which no management decision has been made by the commencement of the reporting period	1	$2,000
Which were issued during the reporting period	1	$36
Subtotal	2	$2,036
For which management decision was made during the reporting period	0	$0
• dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management o based on proposed management action o based on proposed legislative action	0	$0
• dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management	1	$0
For which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period	2	$2,036
Reports for which no management decision was made within 6 months of issuance	1	$2,000

[6] A recommendation that funds be put to better use is a recommendation by OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if Department management took actions to implement and complete the recommendations, including: reductions in outlays, deobligation of funds from programs or operations; withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the Department, a contractor, or a grantee, avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in preaward reviews of contract or grant agreements; or any other savings which are specifically identified.

Table 3

Investigations Statistics
April 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016

	Dollar Value (in thousands)
Recoveries	$0
Fines and Restitutions	$0
Investigative Cases Opened	4
Investigative Cases Closed	2
Proactive Efforts (Surveys, Analysis, Evaluations, Inspections, and Internal Control Reviews) Opened	3
Proactive Efforts (Surveys, Analysis, Evaluations, Inspections, and Internal Control Reviews) Closed	2
Arrests	0
Indictments	0
Convictions	0
Personnel Actions	0
Total Complaints Received	30
Hotline Complaints Received	25
Complaints from Other Sources	3
Complaints Referred (to Department or other agencies)	4
Inspector General Subpoenas	0



OIG Hotline
(1-866-906-2446)

As part of its duties and responsibilities, OIG maintains a toll-free Hotline that provides employees and private citizens an opportunity to relay information regarding fraud, waste, and abuse.

IG Act Reporting Requirements

IG Act Section	IG Act Requirement	Page
Section 4(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	3
Section 5(a)(1)	Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	7-13 15-17
Section 5(a)(2)	Recommendations for Corrective Action Made During the Reporting Period with Respect to Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	7-13 15-17
Section 5(a)(3)	Significant Recommendations Included in Previous Semiannual Reports on Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed	21-28
Section 5(a)(4)	Matters Referred to Prosecuting Authorities and Prosecutions and Convictions which Resulted	None
Section 5 (a)(5)	Summary of Reports Issued to the Head of the Establishment During the Reporting Period	None
Section 5(a)(6)	Reports Issued During the Reporting Period	20
Section 5(a)(7)	Summary of Particularly Significant Reports	7-13 15-17
Section 5(a)(8)	Questioned and Unsupported Costs (Statistical Table 1)	30
Section 5(a)(9)	Recommendations that Funds be put to Better Use (Statistical Table 2)	31
Section 5(a)(10)	Summary of Reports Issued before the commencement of the Reporting Period for which no Management Decision has been made by the end of the Reporting Period	30-31
Section 5(a)(11)	Significant Revised Management Decisions made during the Reporting Period	N/A
Section 5(a)(12)	Management Decisions with which the Inspector General is in Disagreement	None
Section 5(a)(13)	Information Described Under Section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (Specifically excluded by Public Law 109-55)	N/A
Section 5(a)(14-16)	Peer Review Reporting Requirements	29

Working Relationship Principles for Agencies and Offices of Inspectors General

The *Inspector General Act* establishes for most agencies an OIG and sets out its mission, responsibilities, and authority. The unique nature of the IG function can present a number of challenges for establishing and maintaining effective working relationships. To work most effectively together, the agency and its OIG need to clearly define what each considers a productive relationship and then consciously manage toward that goal in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

By providing objective information for promoting Government management, decision-making, and accountability, OIG contributes to the agency's success. OIG is an agent of positive change, focusing on eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse, and on identifying problems and recommendations for corrective actions by agency leadership. OIG provides the agency, Board, and Congress with objective assessments of opportunities to be more successful. Although not under the direct supervision of the Chief, OIG must keep the Board and Congress fully and currently informed of significant OIG activities. Given the complexity of management and policy issues, OIG and the agency may sometimes disagree on the extent of a problem and the need for and scope of corrective action. However, such disagreements should not cause the relationship between OIG and the agency to become unproductive. The following working relationship principles provide some guidance for agencies and OIGs. **To work together most effectively, OIG and the agency should strive to:**

Foster open communications at all levels. The agency will promptly respond to OIG requests for information to facilitate OIG activities and acknowledge challenges that OIG can help address. Surprises are to be avoided. With limited exceptions, primarily related to investigations, OIG should keep the agency advised of its work and its findings on a timely basis, and strive to provide information helpful to the agency at the earliest possible stage.

Interact with professionalism and mutual respect. Each party should always act in good faith and presume the same from the other. Both parties share, as a common goal, the successful accomplishment of the agency's mission.


Recognize and respect the mission and priorities of the agency and OIG. The agency should recognize OIG's independent role in carrying out its mission within the agency, while recognizing the responsibility of OIG to report both to Congress and to the agency head. OIG should work to carry out its functions with a minimum of disruption to the primary work of the agency. The agency should allow OIG timely access to agency records and other materials.

Be thorough, objective, and fair. OIG must perform its work thoroughly, objectively, and with consideration to the agency's point of view. When responding, the agency will objectively consider differing opinions and means of improving operations. Both sides will recognize successes in addressing management challenges.

Be engaged. OIG and agency management will work cooperatively in identifying the most important areas for OIG work, as well as the best means of addressing the results of that work, while maintaining OIG's statutory independence of operation. In addition, agencies need to recognize that OIG also will need to carry out work that is congressionally requested, mandated by law, or self-initiated.

Be knowledgeable. OIG will continually strive to keep abreast of agency programs and operations, and agency management will be kept informed of OIG activities and concerns being raised in the course of OIG work. Agencies will keep OIG up to date on current matters and events.

Provide feedback. The agency and OIG should implement mechanisms, both formal and informal, that will ensure prompt and regular feedback.



CONTACTING THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Success of the OIG mission to prevent fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement depends on the cooperation of employees and the public. There are several ways to report questionable activity.

Call us at 202-593-3868 or toll-free at 866-906-2446. A confidential or anonymous message can be left 24 hours a day/7 days a week.



Toll-Free
1-866-906-2446

Write us – we are located at:
United States Capitol Police
Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations
119 D Street, NE
Washington, DC 20510



Or visit us – we are located at:
499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 345
Washington, DC 20003





You can also contact us by email at: OIG@USCP.GOV

When making a report, convey as much information as possible such as: Who? What? Where? When? Why? Complaints may be made anonymously or you may request confidentiality.

Additional Information and Copies:

To obtain additional copies of this report, call OIG at 202-593-4201.

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